[4] In the 1950s, Tsou was approached by political scientist Hans Morgenthau, chair of the University of Chicago’s Center for the Study of American Foreign and Military Policy, to explore the Sino-American relationship using both English- and Chinese-language materials.
Tsou asserted that the main reason for the ubiquitous American "failure in China" was the combination of high expectations and low commitment.
Tsou also accused Chiang Kai-shek of being both unable and unwilling to "undertake long overdue reforms", the absence of which drove many Chinese to support the Communists.
During the war in China, Tsou found, most Americans completely misunderstood Chinese communism, and none of them had suggested giving direct military support to the Nationalists.
"[2][4] The historian Mary C. Wright praised it as "thoroughly documented, well written, and dispassionate", but said that the analysis "combines acute specific insights with apodictic general conclusions that do not necessaarily follow from the evidence so admirably presented."
However, some scholars such as University of Wisconsin's Professor Qing Liu questioned the motives of this reputation, arguing that it was not merely professional courtesy, but a self-defensive reaction to the developing racial and political dilemmas of early Cold War America.