Tanks in World War II
[2] The doctrine of armored warfare changed radically in the inter-war years as armies sought ways to avoid the deadlock imposed by modern firepower and looked for the means to restore offensive power on the battlefield.
[4] In contrast, for example, almost 80 percent of French tanks lacked radios,[5] essentially because their battle doctrine was based on a more slow-paced, deliberate conformance to planned movements.
This meant that the entire tank normally had to be turned onto its target by the driver, a much slower process than simply rotating a powered turret.
If the vehicle became immobilized due to engine failure or track damage, it could not rotate its gun to counter opposing tanks, making it highly vulnerable to counterfire.
Even the largest and most powerful of German tank destroyers were found abandoned on the field after a battle, having been immobilized by one or more hits by high explosive (HE) or armor-piercing (AP) shells to the track or front drive sprocket.
This lack of speed was not considered a flaw as they were designed to support infantry assaults on enemy strong points or urban warfare where the ability to outpace a man on foot was deemed unnecessary.
Reliability was an important issue especially in the harsh conditions of North Africa and the mountainous terrain of Southern Europe, where the A10 and A13 in particular were plagued by broken tracks and overheating engines.
[16] British tank crews were trained to fire on the move and the armament was mounted for optimum balance such that the gunner could aim with his body rather than use geared elevation.
Production shortages caused by losses in France and the Battle of the Atlantic forced the British to delay widespread introduction of the Ordnance QF 6-pounder (57 mm) anti-tank gun until 1942.
[16] The lack of an adequate high-explosive shell for the 2-pounder and the growing number of 5 cm KwK 38 anti-tank guns in the Afrika Korps gave the German army in Libya a huge advantage for much of late 1941 and early 1942.
This began to be offset by late 1942 but the Wehrmacht continued to enjoy a 12–18 month lead in tank and anti-tank gun development and production until the end of 1944.
The A10's cross country performance was recorded as poor, due to narrow, easily thrown tracks, but material losses incurred in the aftermath of Operation Dynamo (the evacuation of the BEF from Dunkirk in late May 1940) meant they could not be withdrawn from front line service quickly and so saw combat in small numbers in North Africa, where reliability and suspension performance in the desert conditions was praised.
[18] As war broke out, the British had placed into production the A13, a new faster Cruiser tank utilizing the suspension and running gear concepts of the American designer J. Walter Christie.
[21] For example, the Churchill Armoured Vehicle Royal Engineers (AVRE) fired a short range 230 mm (11.4 inch) direct-fire mortar which was used for destroying buildings and clearing obstacles.
For example, the Scorpion flail tank (a modified Matilda II) had already been used during the North African campaign to clear paths through German minefields.
[28] They were deeply flawed in many ways, yet the M3 Light ("Stuart") and M3 Medium ("Lee" or "Grant") were the best tanks available to the Western Allies and were superior to many of their German counterparts in armor protection and firepower.
Although poorly designed, with a very high profile, it was produced in great numbers and was very effective when engaging targets other than enemy tanks, such as infantry and gun positions.
The British fitted Shermans with the more powerful Ordnance Quick Firing 17 pounder (76.2 mm) gun, a variant known informally as the Firefly.
Some M4 Mediums were equipped with the Duplex Drive system (Sherman DD), which allowed them to swim using a collapsible screen and inflated rubber tubes.
Intended as an improvement of the M4 Sherman, the prolonged time of development meant that only a small number saw combat in the European theater, most notably in the 9th Armored Division's dramatic dash to take the Bridge at Remagen.
As noted above, it was their advanced combined arms doctrine and unrivaled command-and-control capability that gave German mechanized forces their advantage on the battlefield.
[38] The Panzer IV was intended to carry a gun that could be used in support of infantry or other tanks, and was initially armed with a short-barreled 75 mm howitzer to fire high explosive (HE) fragmentation shells.
The trade-off was much weaker side armor; the Panther proved to be deadly in open country and shooting from long range, but was vulnerable in close-quarters combat or to flank shots.
Its powerful gun – and unlike the Tiger I, its very heavy sloped armor – made it superior to nearly every Allied or Soviet tank in a one-on-one confrontation, but poor mobility, speed, and reliability limited its use.
Armament was sufficient for 1940–41, but did not keep up with the increased armor and firepower on Allied or German tanks and anti-tank guns; its engine was underpowered and unreliable, a condition worsened by the harsh desert climate and the initial lack of training of their crews.
Some 90 vehicles were built before the Italian armistice in September 1943 and in connection to that event they were used in the battle against the Germans by the 132nd Armoured Division Ariete in Rome.
It had a more powerful engine and air filters to cope with the harsh conditions of the desert, and an improved version of the 47 mm gun; however, by the time it entered production it was already obsolete.
[46] This proved fatal later when they faced the new generation of Allied tanks, as the great majority of the Japanese models were lightly armored, and not heavily gunned.
However, after December 1941, with the entry of the United States into the conflict, priority continued to be given to warships and aircraft, weapons that were more conducive to naval warfare; attacking across the Pacific, and defending the Empire from the advancing Americans.
[64] Before the end of production in 1942, 136 more LT-35 and a total of 1414 LT-38 were produced for the Wehrmacht at Škoda Works; these tanks saw operational use in the Polish campaign, the Battle of France, and on the Soviet front.
