Taylor Report

Sheffield Wednesday were criticised for the inadequate number of turnstiles at the Leppings Lane end and the poor quality of the crush barriers on the terraces, "respects in which failure by the Club contributed to this disaster.

Questioned why more action had not been taken to screen individuals and improve the flow of supporters approaching the stadium from the west "where the turnstile area was so small and awkwardly laid out", senior police officers responded that policy and practice had been no different from in the past, and they had no reason to anticipate problems as earlier events had proceeded without major incident.

In fact, Taylor noted only two occasions when the entry at Leppings Lane had been the sole access to the north and west sides of the ground, at the 1987 and 1988 semi-finals, with evidence of congestion at both, but owing to good fortune and circumstance police policy "was not put to the same test and strain as a year later".

That occurred because, as both Club and police should have realised, the turnstile area could not easily cope with the large numbers demanded of it unless they arrived steadily over a lengthy period.

The Operational Order and police tactics on the day failed to provide for controlling a concentrated arrival of large numbers should that occur in a short period.

[11]As a result of the inadequate number of turnstiles, it has been calculated that it would have taken until 3:40 pm to get all ticket holders into the Leppings Lane end had an exit gate not been opened.

Once inside the stadium, most fans entering the terraces headed for the central pens 3 and 4, as directed by a large sign above the access tunnel.

[12]Standard procedure for league fixtures was to estimate the size of the visiting fan base, determine how many enclosures need to be opened, then fill each standing area one at a time.

[13] For all-ticket games that had sold out, such as semi-final matches, a different approach was adopted whereby supporters were allowed to enter any enclosure they wished upon arrival.

[15]The official combined capacity of the central pens was 2,200, but the Health and Safety Executive found this should have been reduced to 1,693 as crush barriers and perimeter gates did not conform to the Green Guide.

[17]The anxiety to protect the sanctity of the pitch has caused insufficient attention to be paid to the risk of a crush due to overcrowding.

He concluded that they formed an exacerbating factor[19] and that police, seeking to rationalise their loss of control, overestimated the element of drunkenness in the crowd.

[20] The Hillsborough Independent Panel later noted that, despite being dismissed by the Taylor Report, the idea that alcohol contributed to the disaster proved remarkably durable.

It noted, "The weight placed on alcohol in the face of objective evidence of a pattern of consumption modest for a leisure event was inappropriate.

South Yorkshire Police suggested the late arrival of fans amounted to a conspiracy to gain entry without tickets.

[10] Taylor concluded his criticism of South Yorkshire Police by describing senior officers in command as "defensive and evasive witnesses" who refused to accept any responsibility for error.

[8]It is a matter of regret that at the hearing, and in their submissions, the South Yorkshire Police were not prepared to concede they were in any respect at fault in what occurred.

[25] His final report made 76 recommendations,[26] including a reduction in standing in line with this evidence but that, after a given timescale, all stadiums designated under the Safety of Sports Ground Act 1975 should admit spectators to seated accommodation only.

[34] Several campaigns have been active in attempting to get the government to relax the regulation, and allow standing areas to return to Premiership and Championship grounds.

These changes resulted in a number of terraces being replaced by all-seater stands, two of the early examples being Manchester United's Stretford End and Arsenal's North Bank, which were both demolished in the summer of 1992.

Clubs that had progressed through the football league pyramid from lower levels in a short space of time during the 1990s, were allowed to keep standing accommodation in the top two divisions after the end of the 1993–94 campaign.

Bolton Wanderers had standing accommodation at Burnden Park right up to its closure at the end of the 1996–97 season, after which they relocated to the all-seater Reebok Stadium.

Bolton had first announced their intention to leave Burden Park in favour of a new all-seater stadium just before winning promotion from the league's third tier in 1993.

Plans for a new 20,000-seat stadium in the London Borough of Merton had been unveiled in 1988, with the intention of relocation being completed in the early 1990s, but never materialised and the site was later developed for other uses.

A number of clubs seriously considered relocation in response to the Taylor Report – and did so in the years ahead – but ultimately decided to remain at their original location.

The New Den , opened in 1993, became the first new stadium fully compliant with the safety recommendations of the Taylor Report.