391 v. Terry, 494 U.S. 558 (1990), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that an action by an employee for a breach of a labor union's duty of fair representation entitled him to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment.

The plaintiffs filed a grievance with the union, alleging that McLean had breached the collective bargaining agreement by giving inactive employees preference over them.

McLean obeyed the order of the grievance committee at first, but then recalled the inactive employees, causing them to gain seniority status over the plaintiffs.

Plaintiffs requested a permanent injunction requiring the defendants to restore their seniority and cease their illegal activity.

Marshall conceded that the analogy to a trust action was more convincing, but reasoned that the right to a jury trial depended more on the nature of the issues to be tried.

Since the first part of the analysis failed to produce a dispositive result, Marshall then turned to the type of relief the plaintiffs sought.

Thus, Marshall held that the plaintiffs were requesting a legal remedy, and therefore, on the balance of the issues, were entitled to have their case heard by a jury.

Justice Brennan concurred, but desired to simplify the test for determining a plaintiff's Seventh Amendment rights.

Many of the statutory rights created by Congress are not analogous to anything which existed in the courts of 18th-century England, and judges lack the historical training to analyze such matters consistently.

He felt that the Court's attempt to find an 18th-century common law analogue to the collective-bargaining and fair representation actions in this case was a misguided historical judgment, and that the type of relief sought by the plaintiff was the relevant inquiry.