Hood exfiltrate KGB Major Peter Deriabin to the U.S.[4][5] After Vienna, Bagley was posted to the American Embassy in Bern, Switzerland, from where he ran a CIA program that specialized in recruiting Soviet intelligence officers, diplomats and functionaries in Europe.
[7][8] Bagley was also convinced that KGB Colonel Igor Kochnov had been dispatched to the CIA in 1966 (he had actually contacted the FBI in 1965 and neither he nor J. Edgar Hoover told the CIA about it) in order to hide the aforementioned never-uncovered moles, to boost the flagging "bona fides" of Nosenko by claiming he'd been sent to the U.S. to kidnap or kill both Nosenko and Golitsyn, and to arrange for the eventual kidnapping of Nicholas Shadrin in Vienna in 1975.
[9] In 1994, Bagley befriended former KGB General Sergey Kondrashev who informed him that Polyakov had been arrested and executed in the 1980s because he had started telling the CIA more than he was supposed to after leaving the U.S. in late 1962.
GRU Colonel Pyotr Semyonovich Popov was recruited by the CIA in 1953 in Vienna and spied for the Agency for six years in Austria and East Germany.
[10] In his 2007 book Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries and Deadly Games, Bagley wrote that Popov's treason was revealed to the KGB in early 1957 by his former CIA "dead drop" arranger in Moscow (and future Hoover Institution scholar), Edward Ellis Smith, when Smith met with the KGB officer who had recruited him in Moscow, Vladislav Kovshuk, in Washington D.C. movie houses.
[8][11] Bagley wrote that Smith had been "honey trapped" and recruited by Kovshuk in 1956, and that he was fired because he belatedly told the American Ambassador, Charles E. Bohlen, about the entrapment and how he had allegedly refused to work for the KGB.
(Kovshuk actually stayed in the D.C. area for ten months, working under the diplomatic cover of an ostensible two-year posting at the Soviet Embassy, and didn't meet with now-useless-to-the-KGB "Andrey" until just before he returned to Moscow and his regular KGB position).
[13] In his 2014 article, "Ghosts of the Spy Wars," Bagley said it was implausible that the KGB tried in June 1962 to hide only Smith's involvement with it given the fact that he had ostensibly lost access to secrets five years earlier.
Most importantly, Bagley wrote in Spy Wars that the KGB, in the interest of protecting Smith and the never-uncovered "mole," allowed Popov to continue spying for the CIA until late 1958, at which time (after Oleg Penkovsky had been "trapped like a bear in its den") he was recalled to Moscow on a ruse, secretly arrested and played back against the CIA for a year, finally publicly arrested on 16 October 1959 (the same day Oswald arrived in Moscow), and executed in 1960.
Newman believes that a short time later Smith did some reconnaissance work in Washington so that Bruce Leonard Solie could secretly meet with Kovshuk in those movie houses and convince him that Popov was a traitor to the Soviet Union.
Ambassador to Switzerland, Henry J. Taylor, opened and read the letter, and decided not to forward it to Hoover, but to turn it over to CIA station chief Bagley who was working "under cover" at the embassy as Second Secretary.
[22][23][24][25] Nosenko volunteered to Bagley and Kisevalter that the KGB had developed such high-quality listening devices that an electronic "bug" built into an ashtray or a vase was able to record very clearly a conversation in a Moscow restaurant allegedly between an American Assistant Naval Attaché (Leo J. Dulacki) and an Indonesian military attaché by the name of "Zepp" — a name Bagley didn't know, but had the presence of mind to have Nosenko spell out for him.
This incident became critically important later when it was learned that Oleg Penkovsky's Moscow handler, Greville Wynne, had told his British de-briefer after he was released from a Soviet prison that, while incarcerated, the KGB had asked him who "Zepp" was.
[29] Bagley wrote that during his incarceration, Nosenko had been subjected to polygraph exams, harsh (but not tortuous) interrogation sessions, a minimal-but-adequate diet, and Spartan living conditions.
In his testimony, Hart claimed Nosenko was a true defector and that he had been misunderstood, mishandled and mistreated by Bagley and his Soviet Bloc Division colleagues before and during his three-year incarceration.
On October 11, 1978, Bagley sent a 40-page letter to G. Robert Blakey, chief counsel and staff director to the HSCA, in which he forcefully rebutted Hart's testimony and requested permission to testify to the Committee.
In the additional 130 pages of oral testimony Bagley gave to the HSCA on 16 November 1978, he isn't identified by name but is referred to as "Mr. D.C.," as in Deputy Chief (of CIA's Soviet Bloc Division).
Several reviews and analyses, both positive and negative, have been published either online or in hard-copy about Bagley's 2007 Yale University Press book, Spy Wars: Moles, Mysteries, and Deadly Games.
[40] In his 1982 book about the Popov case, Mole: The True Story of the First Russian Intelligence Officer Recruited by the CIA, Hood protected the identities of himself, agent-handler George Kisevalter, and Bagley by changing their names to "Peter Todd," "Gregory Domnin" and "Amos Booth," respectively.