The Blue Eagle at Work: Reclaiming Democratic Rights in the American Workplace is a legal treatise written by Charles J. Morris which analyzes collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the federal statute governing most private sector labor relations in the United States.

Published in 2005 by Cornell University Press, the text claims that the NLRA guarantees that employees under that Act have the right to bargain collectively through minority unions—but only on a members-only basis—in workplaces where there is not an established majority union, notwithstanding that the present practice and general understanding of the law is that only majority-union employees are entitled to engage in collective bargaining on an exclusivity basis.

Chapter Two provides an in-depth and exceedingly detailed history of legislative attempts to enact improvements in federal labor law.

"[8] "As a consequence," Morris concludes, "only a few years after Taft-Hartley, the NLRB and its union and employer constituents were routinely viewing majority-union bargaining—which was certainly the ultimate goal intended by the Act—as the only bargaining contemplated by the Act.

This chapter provides the heart of Morris' thesis, for although it is supported by legislative history (and constitutional and international law), its primary basis is contained in the unambiguous text of the statute.

Morris also discusses three key Supreme Court rulings—NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979), Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr.

In Chapter Seven, Morris discusses how the Supreme Court's doctrine of "administrative deference" (outlined in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)) could provide another avenue for judicial articulation of his thesis.

Although it is a basic premise of his book that the defined duty to bargain is mandatory under the Act, if the NLRB were to find the applicable language ambiguous it could and should exercise its discretionary authority and require bargaining in accordance with the thesis—which under step two of the Chevron doctrine would be confirmed by a reviewing federal court even if the court were in disagreement, for the determination would not be "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."

[12] Chapter Nine discusses the current state of NLRB and court rulings which might appear to exclude members-only minority-union collective bargaining.

Morris also dismisses four "group-dealing"[14] cases, in which the question was whether an employer has a duty to meet and bargain with groups of nonunion employees under the "mutual aid or protection" language of Section 7.

The three chapters of Part III discuss how unions might go about reaffirming the right to engage in members-only minority-union collective bargaining.

Morris also discusses novel approaches, such as direct legal action against the NLRB's General Counsel and picketing for members-only recognition.

Legal scholars addressed the merits of the theory, and discussed its application to a variety of other "pre-union" organizations such as worker centers.

[43] Some of the reviews expressed greater or lesser degrees of skepticism about the likelihood of Morris' thesis being adopted but praised the work highly.

"[It] is a remarkably compelling, innovative stroke, one which should be taken very seriously by those who wish to see any kind of renaissance for workers' collective power," wrote one reviewer, whose assessment was typical.

Twenty-five of those professors joined in a letter to the NLRB on August 14, 2007, endorsing the rulemaking petition that was proposing adoption of such a rule.

One supportive reviewer, Judge John True, wrote: "Nothing in the actual language of the NLRA, in its legislative history, in NLRB or court cases, in the constitution, in international law, or indeed in common sense or sound policy suggests that unions could not still use this 'members-only' bargaining approach."

He reads the language of Section 7 as "all inclusive," explaining that Morris never denied, indeed emphasized, that the ultimate objective of the Act was majority-based collective bargaining.

[51] Morris' interpretation of the NLRA's legislative history and statutory text has come under fire from one scholar in a brief review in a Canadian journal.

He presented his opposing opinion, but without any explanatory analysis or cited authority, as follows: One need only read the statute, however, with or without this history, to conclude that because of the lack of ambiguity in the language, step one of the Chevron doctrine mandates that "[i]f the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.

As Morris himself admits, "it is widely known and fully documented that the United States does not comply with ILO standards regarding the right of workers to engage in collective bargaining.

[60] Despite his criticism of Morris' constitutional and international law analyses, this reviewer agreed with Morris' primary analysis based on the wording of the NLRA, stating that "Section 7 protects concerted activities in various contexts by employees where there is no exclusive representative, and the language of section 7 itself does seem to provide for MUB [i.e., minority union bargaining].

Employers may not respond favorably when a proposed solution will force them to alter work rules and personnel policies across the entire workforce.

"[62] On the other hand, the same problems—if they are problems—could also exist where voluntary recognition and bargaining occurs with a members-only minority union, which is unquestionably legal under the Act.

In 2006, the United Steelworkers organized a members-only minority union at Dick's Sporting Goods, a sporting-goods retailer located near Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.

In his quarterly review of the activities of the Office of the General Counsel, Ronald Meisburg reiterated his conclusion that the NLRA does not require employers to bargain with members-only minority unions.