In an effort to limit a potential runaway tort and to avoid the burdensome case-by-case analysis warned of in Dillon v. Legg, the court refined the necessary elements of a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress first enunciated in Dillon into a bright-line rule:[2] Based on the strict formulation of the second element, the court ruled that the plaintiff could not recover because she was not present at the scene and not aware of the injury at the time of the accident.

Kaufman bemoaned the guidelines of Dillon v. Legg as hopelessly arbitrary, and advocated a return to the zone of danger rule as enunciated in Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co.[4] Justice Mosk's dissent voiced substantial agreement with Broussard's dissent, but also made a point of criticizing the majority's perspective on precedent.

Mosk noted that a long list of California cases, including Archibald v. Braverman, Krouse v. Graham, Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals, and State Rubbish Association v. Siliznoff evidenced an enduring theme of expanding tort liability for emotional distress.

[5] Justice Broussard's dissent criticized the rigid rules imposed by the majority decision as arbitrary and something that can inevitably lead to under-compensation for real emotional distress injuries.

Instead of bright line rules, Broussard advocated that liability be determined by the application of well developed tort principles of foreseeability and duty.