[3] They designated as the date of the departure of the Army of the Upper Danube 7 July, under the leadership of Major General György Klapka, who had to fulfil the duties temporarily of the convalescent Görgei.

[2] Görgei who, despite being convalescent, was present in the council, proposed a Hungarian attack at 9 July against the forces of Field Marshall Julius Jacob von Haynau, in order to facilitate the upcoming march of the Upper Danube Army towards southeast.

[2] After discussing with the chief of staff Colonel József Bayer, but without informing Görgei, who was feeling ill that day, he ordered to the I Corps led by Nagysándor, to start their march towards Pest.

[6] In the days before the battle the government, the ministry council, and the high commandment represented by Lieutenant General Mészáros issued contradictory decisions regarding the remaining of the Army of Upper Danube in Komárom, or its departure, as well as its route towards Southern Hungary.

[7] Later he wrote that because of the danger of the enemy's approach, he is forced to make the Chain bridge unusable, and the only still usable way for the army to march to the meeting point at Szeged was on the left bank of the Danube, through Vác, but its safer to remain in Komárom.

[8] On the Austrian side Field Marshal Haynau knew that he cannot move away from Komárom, one of the most modern fortification system of the empire, until the Hungarian Army of the Upper Danube, with its 40,000 soldiers was behind its walls.

[14] After the aforementioned battle the I corps led by General József Nagysándor and the detachment of Ármin Görgey, which until then were guarding North-West Hungary, arrived in Komárom.

Haynau drew attention to all the organizational tasks that might require the soldiers to take up defensive formations immediately, to repel enemy attempts to break the lines, to counterattack if possible, or, if necessary, to retreat in an orderly manner.

[19] Also the conflict between Görgei and the political leadership of the country, as well as with a part of the officers, and the news about the plan of the government to depose Görgei from the commandment of the army, putting in his place Lieutenant General Lázár Mészáros, spread also among the soldiers, as well as the fact that they considered the orders, which, unlike before the earlier battles, they were informed not in an encouraging, [...] but in a somber tone, as lacking any chance to end successfully, contributing also to the unrest and insecurity of the soldiers, causing them to have doubts about the chances of success of in the forthcoming battle.

Despite this Klapka blamed this on the wrong decisions of the military operations office headed by Colonel Bayer, while other sources claim that he himself set a new date to 'lull' the enemy's attention.

[24] According to one of the division commanders, Colonel János Máriássy, the cause of the delay was that during the night Klapka received news about enemy troops' movements, and he had to verify by sending scouts, to what degree these affect the forthcoming attack.

[25] Finally the Hungarian units started to march towards the enemy positions only around 9.00 a.m.[5] The wounded and still convalescent General Görgei followed the battle with binoculars from the Star Trench (Csillagsánc) of Komárom, as a simple spectator.

[28] Although the scouts reported no enemy troops at Mocsak, Major General József Nagysándor ordered his troops to stop halfway, near the vineyards of Ószőny, and to deploy for battle in three infantry lines, sending, according to Colonel János Máriássy an envoy to Klapka, and asking for further orders about what to do next, although he heard from every direction the sound of the cannonade, signaling that the battle started on the whole front.

After receiving also the report of Colonel Boyneburg, Major General Karl Joseph Franz Freiherr Wolf von Wachtentreu sent an infantry platoon to Naszály.

[32] Klapka ordered Pikéthy that with these 28 hussar companies to attack the Austrian cavalry which he supposed to be at Herkály, and chase them over the Concó creek, breaking the enemy's battle line in two.

[35] Sensing the importance of the semicircular defense lines from Csém, Haynau moved the Russian Panyutyin division closer: on a height west from Kisigmánd to, and to leave only 2 battalions to defend Nagyigmánd.

[36] But right when the Herzinger division started to accomplish Haynau's order, mentioned above, to turn around, according to the Austrian report, the brigade from their right was attacked by a couple of Hungarian battalions, through the cornfield which hid their presence until then.

[41] Unlike the Pikéthy and Nagysándor, Haynau was much more active, trying to resolve this grave danger for his army, organizing the Reserve corps's right flank to hold the defensive positions in and around Csém, and sending the 18.

The Hungarian main commander of this battle, General Klapka ordered his reserve batteries to advance to the III corps, and respond to Wohlgemuth's guns, so a harsh artillery duel started with the participation of 140 cannons, which lasted an hour, giving to Leiningen time to reorganize his infantry.

[33] According to historian Tamás Csikány the Hungarian rout actually did happen, started by the 3. battalion of the 19. infantry regiment, which run into the advancing troops, creating panic among them, only the famous 9.

long open area between the Herkály grange and the southern edge of the Ács forest, which could represent a danger of suffering great losses if the Austrian artillery or cavalry would have attacked them, but in the case of a success, would have contributed in a decisive way to a Hungarian victory.

General Ludwig first sent two companies to reinforce his outposts and to confirm the news, then he deployed his brigade between the Herkály farm and the southern edge of the Ács forest.

[47] But nevertheless, because of Pikéthy's inactivity, and refusal to send them to attack the Herkály grange and the line of the Concó creek when it was the possibility to take them, their heroism did not pay off in the result of the battle.

[51] But the Hungarians could not bring with them their batteries, and during the fight they used all their cartridges, so when they arrived to the western edge of the forest, they were hit very hard by the Austrian artillery and infantry, reinforced by the Bianchi, Reischach and Sartori brigades.

The Hungarians resisted with great losses, but when the encircling Austrian battalion appeared, they retreated in disorder until the vineyards near the Monostor fort, where Lieutenant Colonel Rakovszky tried to reorganize them.

[56] This is why Haynau ordered the Simbschen cavalry brigade to deploy on the Russians right flank, and attack Leiningen's troops from the left, joined by the Panyutyin and finally by the Herzinger division.

corps led by Colonel Ferenc Aschermann retreated in order, while others (Major Szillányi) present it as a total disorder and panic, routing under the firing of the Austrian artillery.

According to Szillányi only a half twelve-pounder battery and a couple of companies of the Württemberg hussars, which covered the retreat kept their order and repelled the pursuing units, although they too suffered great losses from the firing of the Austrian kaiserjägers.

[64] Csikány suspects that the cause that this good strategist made these mistakes, was that he accepted to lead his troops in this battle unwillingly, only because he was ordered to do so, and perhaps his only serious purpose in it was to save the army from greater losses, before he sent them towards Szeged.

[64] As it was shown before, Klapka did not lead with the necessary vigor his uncertain and passive generals (Nagysándor and Pikéthy), although to achieve a victory in such a battle all the units had to carry out their tasks with the maximum determination and strength.