[4] A member of Zeta Psi fraternity, and Phi Beta Kappa society, Gates graduated with his Bachelor of Arts in English in 1928.

During World War II he served in the Navy, rose to the rank of lieutenant commander, and participated in campaigns in the Pacific and Mediterranean areas.

Believing that the Secretary of Defense had all the authority he needed and that time should be allowed for evaluation of the long range effects of the 1958 amendments, he discouraged efforts to further revamp the department.

Less than a month after becoming secretary, he reminded the chiefs of their responsibility to apprise him of disputes and proposed to meet with them in order to expedite settlement or bring the issue to the president's attention for final resolution.

By December 1960 the JSTPS had prepared the first Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP), which specified for various attack options the timing, weapons, delivery systems, and targets to be used by U.S. strategic forces.

Gates devoted more time than his predecessors Charles E. Wilson and Neil H. McElroy to the development of basic defense policy, a sphere in which the president remained dominant.

As Gates pointed out at a congressional hearing in January 1960, the two principal U.S. defense objectives were "to deter the outbreak of general war by maintaining and improving our present capability to retaliate with devastating effectiveness in case of a major attack upon us or our allies" and "to maintain, together with our allies, a capability to apply to local situations the degree of force necessary to deter local wars, or to win or contain them promptly if they do break out."

Not only was the United States developing or beginning to deploy a variety of missile systems during this period-Atlas, Titan, Minuteman, and Polaris-but so was the Soviet Union.

The USSR's emphasis on the land-based ICBM rather than the manned bomber as its primary strategic delivery system presaged a threat of such magnitude to the United States that, together with the Sputnik shock, it forced an acceleration in the pace of U.S. missile development.

Perhaps the most spectacular event of Gates's administration occurred on 1 May 1960 when the Soviet Union shot down over its territory a Lockheed U-2 reconnaissance aircraft piloted by Francis Gary Powers.

On the recommendation of representatives from the State and Defense departments, including Gates, President Eisenhower later admitted that the U-2 was on an intelligence-gathering mission (actually under CIA control) and assumed responsibility for the flight.

Gates suggested later that the Russian leader used the U-2 crisis to abort a meeting that he had determined in advance would not result in gains for the Soviet Union.

On the eve of the summit conference, Gates ordered a worldwide alert of U.S. military communications facilities a decision criticized by some as provocative.

Stoutly defending his action, Gates later explained that he decided, with the concurrence of Eisenhower and Secretary of State Christian A. Herter, to call the alert when he became aware of the belligerent position Khrushchev intended to take when the summit convened the next day.

Moreover, since the command and individuals concerned in the decision process, including the President, the Secretary of State, and myself, were overseas, it was important to check out our military communications."

To criticism of the Eisenhower administration's continuing efforts to hold down the DoD budget, Gates replied that the department was spending enough money to meet the nation's vital security needs.

There were those who regarded him as the first of a new breed of secretaries of defense who would take a more active management approach evidenced by his regular meetings with the JCS and establishment of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff.

After John F. Kennedy's election to the presidency in 1960, the press speculated that he might include a Republican in his cabinet and that Gates would be high on the list of possible appointees.

President Richard M. Nixon appointed him chairman of the Advisory Commission on an All-Volunteer Force, which presented its recommendations to end the draft on February 21, 1970.