Tito–Stalin split

Although presented by both sides as an ideological dispute, the conflict was as much the product of a geopolitical struggle in the Balkans that also involved Albania, Bulgaria, and the communist insurgency in Greece, which Tito's Yugoslavia supported and the Soviet Union secretly opposed.

In the years following World War II, Yugoslavia pursued economic, internal, and foreign policy objectives that did not align with the interests of the Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc allies.

When the conflict between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union became public in 1948, it was portrayed as an ideological dispute to avoid the impression of a power struggle within the Eastern Bloc.

Deprived of aid from the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc, Yugoslavia subsequently turned to the United States for economic and military assistance.

[1] The Soviet Union, still honouring the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, broke off relations with the Yugoslav government and sought, through its intelligence assets, to set up a new Communist organisation independent of the KPJ in the NDH.

[5] In 1943, Tito transformed the Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) into an all-Yugoslav deliberative and legislative body, denounced the government-in-exile, and forbade King Peter's return to the country.

Specifically, Stalin feared for the Soviet-backed Austrian government [de] of Karl Renner, and was afraid that a wider conflict with the Allies over Trieste would ensue.

[18] Marshal Fyodor Tolbukhin's Third Ukrainian Front had to request formal permission from Tito's provisional government to enter Yugoslavia and had to accept Yugoslav civil authority in any liberated territory.

[21] In 1945, Yugoslavia relied on United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration aid as it experienced food shortages, but it gave much greater internal publicity to comparably smaller Soviet assistance.

[30] The two countries' militaries also cooperated, at least in the mining of the Corfu Channel in October 1946—an action which damaged two Royal Navy destroyers and resulted in 44 dead and 42 injured.

[32] Despite this, when the Cominform was established in September to facilitate international Communist activity and communication,[33] the Soviets openly touted Yugoslavia as a model for the Eastern Bloc to emulate.

[38] Shortly after Đilas and Stalin met, Tito suggested to Hoxha that Albania should permit Yugoslavia to use military bases near Korçë, close to the Albanian–Greek border, to defend against a potential Greek and Anglo–American attack.

Finally, on 26 January, the British government warned the Bulgarian authorities against any federation arrangement with Yugoslavia before Bulgaria signed a peace treaty with the Allies.

[44] Three years later, in 1948, when Tito and Hoxha were preparing to deploy the Yugoslav People's Army to Albania, the Bulgarian Workers' Party leader Georgi Dimitrov spoke to Western journalists about turning the Eastern Bloc into a federally organised state.

[46] In response to Molotov's summons, Tito dispatched Kardelj and President of the Executive Council of the People's Republic of Croatia Vladimir Bakarić to Moscow, where they joined Đilas.

Yugoslav and Bulgarian participants in the meeting acknowledged mistakes, and Stalin made Kardelj and Dimitrov sign a treaty obliging Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to consult the Soviet Union on all foreign policy matters.

[50] The KPJ Central Committee met on 1 March and noted that Yugoslavia would remain independent only if it resisted Soviet designs for the economic development of the Eastern Bloc.

[52] The Central Committee also dismissed the possibility of a federation with Bulgaria, interpreting it as a form of Trojan horse tactic, and decided to proceed with the existing policy towards Albania.

[54] In his letter, Stalin denounced Tito and Kardelj, as well as Đilas, Svetozar Vukmanović, Boris Kidrič, and Aleksandar Ranković, as "dubious Marxists" responsible for the anti-Soviet atmosphere in Yugoslavia.

To discredit him, charges were fabricated alleging that Hebrang had become a spy for the Croatian ultra-nationalist and fascist Ustaše movement during his captivity in 1942, and that he was subsequently blackmailed with that information by the Soviets.

[59] In their response to the second letter, Tito and Kardelj rejected arbitration by the Cominform and accused Stalin of lobbying other communist parties to affect the outcome of the dispute.

Stalin then sent his third letter, now addressed to Tito and Hebrang, stating that failure to speak on behalf of the KPJ before the Cominform would amount to a tacit admission of guilt.

[62] Moreover, the Cominform accused the KPJ of opposing the parties within the organisation, splitting from the united socialist front, betraying international solidarity of the working people, and assuming a nationalist posture.

[62] Faced with the choice of resisting or submitting to Stalin, Tito chose the former, likely counting on the KPJ's wide organic base, built through the Partisan movement, to support him.

The real or perceived supporters of Stalin were termed "Cominformists" or "ibeovci" as a pejorative initialism based on the first two words in the official name of the Cominform—the Information Bureau of the Communist and Workers' Parties.

[65] Yugoslavia faced significant economic difficulties as a result of the split since its planned economy had depended on unimpeded trade with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc.

[66] The United States regarded the split as an opportunity to score a Cold War victory, but it employed a cautious approach, uncertain if the rift would be permanent or if Yugoslav foreign policy would change.

In return, the U.S. demanded the cessation of Yugoslav aid to the DSE when the internal situation in Yugoslavia allowed for such a move without endangering Tito's position.

[84] In an effort to discredit Tito, the Soviets helped Bulgaria establish three intelligence operations posts along the country's border with Yugoslavia – in Vidin, Slivnitsa, and Dupnitsa.

[87] In 1952, the Soviet Ministry of State Security planned to assassinate Tito with a biological agent and a poison codenamed Scavenger, but Stalin died in 1953, before the plot could be implemented.