Common Fisheries Policy

[citation needed] When it came into force in 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon formally enshrined fisheries conservation policy as one of the handful of "exclusive competences" reserved for the European Union, to be decided by Qualified Majority Voting.

EU support covers similar areas to other land installations, but with additional concerns of technical and environmental problems caused by introducing major fish concentrations where farms are built.

STECF generally provides its advice to the European Commission taking account of the work conducted by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) and other regional fisheries advisory intergovernmental organisations.

The proposals are subsequently submitted to the relevant regional fisheries management organisations for consultations with non-EU fishing nations, and adjusted when necessary.

They are empowered to take produce out of the market if prices fall below levels set by the Council of Ministers and receive compensation from the EU.

In 1977 an aid programme was introduced to improve the fish processing industries, currently operating as the European Maritime, Fisheries and Aquaculture Fund.

There has been an attempt to introduce new technologies to the sector, improve hygiene conditions, and also fund conversions of fish processing factories to other uses.

Funding is available to assist modernisation of boats and installations, but also to buy-out fishermen to reduce the fleet size.

Due to growing demands to make the Common Fisheries Policy more decentralised (see #The CFP governance vs. the principle of subsidiarity section below), two regional groups of member states have been established through respective memoranda of understanding, one named BALTFISH which has included all the EU member states with a Baltic coast, while the other one, known as the Scheveningen Group, has been its North Sea counterpart.

These groups lack, however, any decision-making or enforcement powers essential for a regional fisheries management organisation, thus neither of them has been treated as such.

Subsequently, the fisheries guidance (or structural) funding was split-off from EAGGF to form the separate Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG) in 1993, while the fish market interventions have remained a task of the EAGGF and its successor, the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF).

The adoption of the EMFAF was not uncontested, in particular by environmental groups, as it includes the possibility to fund vessel modernisation and other measures, which might increase pressure on already overfished stocks.

In contrast, the regional fisheries advisory bodies (RFABs) may be joined both by the EU and directly by its the members states.

Because of that, the Gdańsk Convention was terminated and the IBFC was dissolved on 1 January 2007, while its tasks have been taken over directly by the EU CFP, though they have been exercised in cooperation with Russia, as arranged in the Agreement between the European Community and the Government of the Russian Federation on cooperation in fisheries and the conservation of the living marine resources in the Baltic Sea.

[11] Nevertheless, the sea has still remained managed by a tuna RMFO (ICCAT) and two further specialised RFMOs dedicated to salmon (NASCO) and whaling (IWC).

In 1997 North Sea states and EU representatives agreed a joint approach to identifying risks to the marine environment.

[16] According to scientific research published in 2010, the depletion of fishing stocks is a consequence of mismanagement long before the Common Fisheries Policy came into being, a statement illustrated by the fact that British catch rates have declined by 94% over the last 118 years.

Although Member States hold some responsibilities, such as the distribution of quotas, it is argued that the EU retains too much authority over fisheries management.

[25] The command-and-control method characterised by the CFP is no longer deemed an effective form of fisheries management, and advocates of CFP reform consider a shift from traditional government to participatory third-order governance, incorporating the fisheries industry and Member States, to be vital to the success of the policy.

[26] Consequently, it is suggested that the management of the CFP could be improved through the application of the theory of subsidiarity—the principle that political decisions should be handled at the lowest, least-centralised competent level.

[27] The subsidiarity principle was introduced into EU policies as part of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty; however, it does not apply to areas such as the CFP over which the Community retains exclusive competence.

[28] A partial devolution of authority, for example involving Member States in the decision-making process and delegating the day-to-day management of fisheries to industry-based organisations, could potentially facilitate the inclusion of industry concerns into the CFP, involving those directly affected by the policy in management decisions and creating to a CFP which encourages compliance and collaboration.

This increasing monopoly and disregard for the wishes of the fisheries industry led to alienation of stakeholders and resulted in reduced compliance.

[31] However, some critics argue that applying the subsidiarity principle to the CFP may not improve the policy's effectiveness, as it may lead to what de Vivero et al. term the "participation paradox"—the theory that the greater the number of actors involved in the decision-making process, the less significant the contribution made by each actor, and the smaller the participatory role played in the policy process.

Greater devolution within CFP decision-making may therefore silence the voice of the fisheries industry as it competes with other state, private and civil actors to whom authority is also granted.

The original six therefore drew up Council Regulation 2141/70 giving all Members equal access to all fishing waters,[33] even though the Treaty of Rome did not explicitly include fisheries in its agriculture chapter.

In 1976 the EC extended its fishing waters from 12 nautical miles to 200 nautical miles (22.2 km to 370.4 km) from the coast, in line with other international changes; however, fishing rights to fisheries outside the EU were significantly reduced when exclusive economic zones were defined in 1982.

This now had four areas of activity: conservation of stocks, vessels and installations, market controls, and external agreements with other nations.

In February 2013 the European Parliament voted for reform of the Common Fisheries Policy, including measures to protect endangered stocks, and the ending of discards.

In presenting the reform package, the German Social Democrat MEP Ulrike Rodust stated: "As of 2015 the principle of maximum sustainable yield shall apply ... Our objective is that depleted fish stocks recover by 2020.