The crew of the ATR 42 regional turboprop lost control of the aircraft's pitch and were both killed in the accident.

The accident was investigated by the Brazilian Air Force's Aeronautical Accidents Investigation and Prevention Center (Portuguese: Centro de Investigação e Prevenção de Acidentes Aeronáuticos (CENIPA)), with a final report issued in March 2007.

[3] Investigators determined from conversation on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) that the pilot never left the cockpit area, but the fact that he left his seat and that communication between the crew was poor during the accident sequence cost the crew time to search for a solution and may have been a factor in the crash.

The crew was not trained for a "runaway trim" scenario and no procedure for dealing with this were found in the manuals written by the aircraft manufacturer.

[3] The activation of the event button was most likely inadvertent because no abnormalities were found on the FDR and neither pilot mentioned pushing it.

The stand by trim switch is located close to the event button and it is possible that it too was activated without the crews knowledge causing the autopilot to disengage.

[3] Examination of the ATR 42's history shows several reports of trim control concerns that the Federal Aviation Administration issued Airworthiness Directive(s) (AD) for.

An incident in 2001 led the Civil Aviation of France to issue an AD for ATR 42 type aircraft as well.