[citation needed] Ships were assigned places in these orders by the commander, sometimes temporarily or even extemporaneously.
The combined French-Spanish fleet left Cadiz harbour in a loose line and turned to the south along the coast of Andalusia, headed for Naples through the Straits of Gibraltar.
It struck the ships from the side, causing them to roll and ruining their stability as gun platforms.
When full it is curved in such a way as to create a sideways "lift," or force perpendicular to its surface, one component of which is actually against the general direction of the wind.
In order to travel in that direction, it must "fall off," or move to an angle with the wind on one side or the other, a "tack."
However, because of the huge distance a square-rigger had to travel before it could fill its sails again, tacking would only be done in a dire emergency; where speed of manoeuvre outweighed the enormous risk of being caught in irons.
If the wind is too great the sails may have to be shortened to present less area, a procedure call "reefing."
A ship with the storm wind abeam is struck longitudinally and rolls treacherously, running a risk of capsizing.
Much has been made of the tactics of various great sailing captains, but the greatest constraints come from wind direction and relative position.
Nelson's battle plan is revealed on a surviving "memorandum" to his captains scrawled on a sheet of paper.
The memorandum was meant to be official, as it is signed "Nelson and Bronte"[c] and dated "Victory, off Cadiz, 9th October, 1805," which was 12 days before the battle on the 21st.
In order "to make the business decisive," Nelson would attack on sight, going directly for the enemy line.
The general orders from Nelson were to "make the attack upon the enemy, and to follow up the blow until they are captured or destroyed.
"[citation needed] If individual ships were momentarily lost in the confusion, they could do no better, said Nelson, than to pull alongside an enemy and fight broadside.
Such a scenario implies the enemy stretched across Nelson's port bow quarter moving anticlockwise, but he did not know where the wind would be.
If not, the opportunity was lost; they would have to fall off to leeward, wear, and come up on the other side, by which time the hoped-for battle would be only a pursuit.
Nelson hoped to destroy all the ships to the rear before the enemy's van could wear round and join the battle.
If the enemy van tacked or wore in an effort to stage a rescue, the British fleet would station itself between them and the captured and disabled ships, and defeat them in further battle.
If on the other hand the enemy fleet was first seen off the lee side; that is, off the starboard bow, the British would be in the strongest position.
Thus the lee line would act by the same instructions, turning to starboard, sail through to the 12th ship from the end.
However, they were sailing clockwise around the British fleet, forcing the weather column to attack their rear[citation needed].
Nelson entertained briefly a proposal to sail up to the entrance to the harbour and saturate it with the new Congreve Rocket, setting the enemy ships on fire.
Higher-level decisions were being made by Napoleon, who could not wait indefinitely for the opportunity to invade Britain, and who had switched his attention to war on the continent, especially Austria and Italy.
Napoleon however, was not as skilled in naval matters and imagined that a fleet of 40 or so large vessels could leave port in an instant.
HMS Africa, somewhat detached to the north due to a combination of weather and a missed signal during the night, was supposed to have been fourth from last, in the lee column.
Just as the battle was beginning they turned individually anticlockwise, wore ship, and came into the wind, hoping to bear down on Nelson.
Prior to closing with the enemy, they were in a single line, and after engagement, the ships manoeuvred to assume the best firing positions.
[6] During the battle the frigates (which had been the force observing Cadiz) and smaller vessels acted in support to the fleet, relaying messages and towing ships but did not engage.
When Collingwood took command after Nelson's death he transferred to Euralyus as his own flagship, the Royal Sovereign, was badly damaged.
Casualties continued over the next few weeks as enemy crews rebelled, retook their ships, and were subdued.