[1] It was not formally recognised by the Soviets at that time, but the Georgian government eventually managed to obtain de facto recognition from the White leaders and the Allies.

Many Georgian politicians, including Foreign Minister, Evgeni Gegechkori regarded that clause as an infringement of Georgia's sovereignty and supported the rejection of the Russian terms.

However, Georgian Prime Minister Noe Zhordania was anxious above all to secure for Georgia international recognition and so agreed to the terms as offered by the Bolsheviks.

"[5]In no case could repressive measures be taken against private persons because they engaged in propaganda and agitation in favour of the Communist programme, nor against groups and organizations based upon it.

Now Article 1 of the Secret Supplement by implication was giving Russia the right to interfere in favour of the Georgian Bolsheviks, whose freedom was guaranteed by treaty.

Nevertheless, the Treaty of Moscow had a short-term benefit to Tbilisi by encouraging the reluctant Allied Supreme Council and other governments to recognise Georgia de jure on 11 January 1921.

Although Soviet Russia had recognised Georgia's independence, the eventual overthrow of the Menshevik government was both intended and planned,[7] and the treaty was merely a delaying tactic on the part of the Bolsheviks,[8] who were then preoccupied with an uneasy war against Poland.

The conflict, never finally resolved, was subsequently used in Soviet propaganda against the Menshevik government, which was accused by Moscow of harassing the communists, obstructing the passage of convoys passing through to Armenia and supporting an anti-Soviet rebellion in the North Caucasus.

On the other hand, Georgia accused Russia of fomenting antigovernment riots in various regions of the country, especially among ethnic minorities such as Abkhazians and Ossetians, and of provoking border incidents along the frontier with Soviet Azerbaijan.