The thesis that some things are true while others are false has led to different theories about the nature of these entities.
Since there is divergence of opinion on the matter, the term truth-bearer is used to be neutral among the various theories.
Truth-bearer candidates include propositions, sentences, sentence-tokens, statements, beliefs, thoughts, intuitions, utterances, and judgements but different authors exclude one or more of these, deny their existence, argue that they are true only in a derivative sense, assert or assume that the terms are synonymous,[1] or seek to avoid addressing their distinction or do not clarify it.
[2] Some distinctions and terminology as used in this article, based on Wolfram 1989[3] (Chapter 2 Section1) follow.
It should be understood that the terminology described is not always used in the ways set out, and it is introduced solely for the purposes of discussion in this article.
A referring-expression[nb 14] is expression that can be used to pick out or refer to particular entity.
A referentially-successful-meaningful-declarative-sentence-token-use[nb 17] is a meaningful-declarative-sentence-token-use containing no referring-expression that fails to identify a particular entity.
As Aristotle pointed out, since some sentences are questions, commands, or meaningless, not all can be truth-bearers.
Theory 1a: All and only meaningful-declarative-sentence-types[nb 18] are truth-bearers Criticisms of theory 1a Some meaningful-declarative-sentence-types will be both truth and false, contrary to our definition of truth-bearer, for example, (i) in liar-paradox sentences such as "This sentence is false", (see Fisher 2008[5]) (ii) and in time, place, and person-dependent sentences such as "It is noon", "This is London", and "I'm Spartacus".
Anyone may ..ascribe truth and falsity to the deterministic propositional signs we here call utterances.
But if he takes this line, he must, like Leibniz, recognise that truth cannot be an affair solely of actual utterances, since it makes sense to talk of the discovery of previously un-formulated truths.
(Kneale, W&M (1962))[6] Revision to Theory 1a, by making a distinction between type and token.
To escape the time, place and person dependent criticism the theory can be revised, making use or the type–token distinction,[7] as follows Theory 1b: All and only meaningful-declarative-sentence-tokens are truth-bearers Quine argued that the primary truth-bearers are utterances [nb 19] Having now recognised in a general way that what are true are sentences, we must turn to certain refinements.
(ii) meaningful-declarative-sentence-token-uses are events (located in particular positions in time and space) and entail a user.
Theory 1d takes option (a) above by declaring that meaningful-declarative-sentence-token-uses that fail referentially are not truth-bearers.
Theory 1e allows for the existence of truth-bearers (i.e., meaningful-declarative-sentence-types) in the absence of users and between uses.
In so far as referentially-successful-meaningful-declarative-sentence-tokens are particulars (locatable in time and space) the definition of truth-bearer just in terms of referentially-successful-meaningful-declarative-sentence is attractive to those who are (or would like to be) nominalists.
In classical logic a sentence in a language is true or false under (and only under) an interpretation and is therefore a truth-bearer.
[10] For example, if a language L consisted in the individual constant a, two unary predicate letters F and G and the variable x, then an interpretation I of L might define the Domain D as animals, assign Socrates to a, the denotation of the property being a man to F, and the denotation of the property being mortal to G. Under the interpretation I of L, Fa would be true if, and only if Socrates is a man, and the sentence
A particular concept of a statement was introduced by Strawson in the 1950s.,[20][21][22] Consider the following: On the assumption that the same person wrote Waverley and Ivanhoe, the two distinct patterns of characters (meaningful-declarative-sentences) I and J make the same statement but express different propositions.