Desertification and droughts in 1972–74 and 84–85 killed livestock and forced the alteration of traditional migration routes, increasing conflict between neighboring groups.

There, militants who blamed their respective national governments for failing to aid communities in need began to co-mingle and form the future rebel groups.

Both Mali and Niger, unable to cope economically with famine, and plagued by weak, authoritarian governments, faced dissent in all communities.

In Niger, president Ali Saïbou, the unelected military successor to 1974 coup leader General Seyni Kountché, was facing similar problems.

That year, a number of Tuareg in Libya formed a political opposition group called the Popular Front for the Liberation of Niger (FPLN).

An armed attack by FPLN members in Tchin-Tabaradene sparked the closing of the borders with Libya and Algeria, and the resettlement of thousands of Tuareg and other nomads away from the area.

[7] The MNJ has formally denied this, but witnesses of one kidnapping attack in Mali said the rebels had moved back towards the Niger border.

[8] Former Malian rebel leaders, notably the 1990s commander Iyad Ag Ghaly, denounced the 2007 violence and called on the Bahanga group to cease their attacks and offered to negotiate on behalf of the Bamako government.

Controversy has continued to revolve around Tuareg leaders brought into government, with the arrest of the Minister of Tourism Rhissa ag Boula in 2004 and his July 2005 pardon, on suspicion of involvement in a political murder.

Niger's Tuaregs continue to watch closely the development and economic activities of the government, especially in regards the Aïr Mountains' burgeoning tourist trade, and Arlit's recovering uranium industry.

In the early first decade of the 21st century, sporadic attacks continued to be claimed by Tuareg groups and the Toubou Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Sahara, but press accounts suggested these have little support in the larger community.

The government of Niger claimed these attacks were the work of small scale "bandits" and drug-trafficking gangs, and has also suggested "foreign interests" (or Areva, specifically) were funding the rebel forces.

[15] On the other hand, the MNJ statements portray their movement as Niger-wide (as opposed to Tuareg nationalism) and limited to the demand for economic, political and environmental reforms.

[16] Niger rebels say their government has failed to honor the 1995 peace deal, which ended the First Tuareg Rebellion and promised them a bigger share of the region's mineral wealth.

[17] Nigerien Tuareg leaders and some Non Government Organizations have claimed the violence of February 2007 was the culmination of widespread disaffection amongst Tuareg ex-combatants with the slow progress of promised benefits, lack of functioning democratic institutions, and a perceived special status given to foreign mining interests and southern political leaders.