The movement was initially catalyzed by rural middle-class workers and youths in the region of Sidi Bouzid, from where Bouazizi hailed, but grew to include diverse swaths of the population.

Since independence, the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT) had been politically active, notably in protesting IMF-imposed cuts to subsidies, but had increasingly been repressed by the Ben Ali regime.

[citation needed] Despite Ben Ali's departure, the ruling Troika led by Islamist party Ennahda proved unable to strike a lasting constitutional settlement in the Constituent Assembly of Tunisia.

[25] As an immediate result of Brahmi's murder, a secular opposition coalition, the National Salvation Front, organized a month-long series of protests in July 2013, culminating in calls for Ennahda to step down.

[26] The Tamarod Movement in Egypt, formed of disparate civil society and political opposition groups, seemed a natural analog to what National Salvation Front activists in Tunisia saw as the correct course of action in deposing the Islamist government.

[25] Their proximity to the Ben Ali regime and the largest corporate firms, role in organizing a number of general strikes, and institutional make-up enabled the UGTT to initiate proceedings.

[28] Following this blow, the second assassination of a prominent opposition figure, that of secular leader Mohamed Brahmi on 25 July 2013 seemed to preclude any further constitutional debate or national dialogue.

[31] Professor Mohamed-Salah Omri describes this protest following Brahmi's assassination as reaching a "critical mass" when Ennahda appreciated that any potential formal coalition between the Quartet and the political opposition would presage regime collapse.

[32] At this juncture, fear of an irreparable civil conflict began to spread, and on 6 August, Constituent Assembly President Moustapha Ben Jaafar halted all legislative proceedings.

[29] At the outset, the UGTT-led coalition made clear that they sought an apolitical government divorced from the extremism they viewed Ennahda as supplying to Tunisian national politics.

[34] They sought: As argued by Hèla Yousfi in Trade Unions and Arab Revolutions: The Tunisian Case of UGTT two "guiding principles" emerged to steer the course of the National Dialogue: that of technocratic, apolitical governance to see Tunisia through the transition, and an immediate halt to all state violence and terror threats.

In particular, Houcine Abassi, Secretary-General of UGTT, was able to move the process forward at critical junctures and willing to use the elevated bargaining power of the now four-strong coalition to push political parties along the path to constitutional ratification.

[36] As reported in Helen Yousfi's work which collected various interviews from those involved in the Dialogue, Abassi was willing to "require representatives from political parties to stay in the room after the meeting if no decision had been made.

Reflected in statements by UGTT officials and UTICA president Ouided Bouchamaoui, opening up Tunisia to foreign investment was a key development the Quartet hoped to achieve.

[38] The legislative elections saw Nidaa Tounes, the dominant party of the National Salvation Front coalition, win a plurality of seats in the Assembly of the Representatives on October 26, 2014.

[2] Kaci Kullmann Five, chairwoman of the Nobel Committee remarked of the Quartet: "It established an alternative peaceful political process at a time when the country was on the brink of civil war.

In particular, the United States and European Union provided impetus for the completion of the Dialogue process by intervening at critical junctures to ensure Ennahda's compliance by way of leveraging economic support.

"[45]While the process was widely hailed by international observers and non-governmental organizations, the actual National Dialogue was decried by more fervent unionists as betraying elements of the Tunisian working poor.

[50] While critics acknowledge "a new public discourse," the September 2014 Invest in Tunisia Conference evinced an economic climate amenable to IMF and World Bank aid packages.

[53] In line with this normative shift, in June 2015 Prime Minister Habib Essid established a National Council of Social Dialogue, composed of representatives from government, UGTT, and UTICA.

[55] Gary A. Stradiotto and Sujian Guo define constituent pacts as "a negotiating unit, comprised of incumbent and opposition groups, attempting to bargain the transition away from authoritarian rule to democracy.

"[56] The National Dialogue process fits this description as both opposition parties, the ruling Troika, and civil society mediators intervened to construct a common path.

A. Holmes and K. Koehler argue that unlike Terry Karl's traditional formulation, continued protests and the high polarization that met Ennahda's governance is evidence that the ruling Troika did not demobilize public unrest.

[38] In addition, Holmes and Koelher note that the assassinations of Belaid and Brahmi, along with a massive surge in Constituent Assembly resignations from the opposition are evidence that elites often failed to find common ground on transition procedure.

[55] Polarization became such that the National Salvation Front included in its coalition in July 2013 a Tunisian Tamarod Movement, of which its analog in Egypt was calling for President Mohamed Morsi's deposition.