The Twenty-fifth Amendment of the Constitution of India, officially known as The Constitution (Twenty-fifth Amendment) Act, 1971, curtailed the fundamental right to property, and permitted the acquisition of private property by the government for public use, on the payment of compensation which would be determined by the Parliament and not the courts.
[1] The amendment also exempted any law giving effect to the article 39(b) and (c) of Directive Principles of State Policy from judicial review, even if it violated the Fundamental Rights.
The Court also held that a law which seeks to acquire or requisition property for public purposes must satisfy the requirement of Article19(1)(f).
However, the second part of section 3, which prevented judicial review of any law that gives effect to Directive Principles, was declared unconstitutional.
"[3][4]In 1970, the Supreme Court, in its judgement on Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union Of India (1970 AIR 564, 1970 SCR (3) 530), popularly known as the Bank Nationalization case, held that the Constitution guarantees the right to compensation, that is, the equivalent money of the property compulsorily acquired.
The Court also held that a law which seeks to acquire or requisition property for public purposes must satisfy the requirement of Article19(1)(f).
The 25th Amendment was intended to strip the Supreme Court of the power to go into the quantum of compensation for takeover of property for public use.
Gajendragadkar, recommended deletion of the part of article 31C which placed any law containing a declaration that it was for giving effect to certain Directive Principles, outside judicial review.
The Commission stated that it would be "unreasonable to prevent any judicial inquiry into the question as to whether laws passed in pursuance of the policy (giving primacy to Directive Principles) bore any connection with the objects intended to be served by it.
530), the Supreme Court has held that the Constitution guarantees right to compensation, that is, the equivalent in money of the property compulsorily acquired.
In the same case, the Court has also held that a law which seeks to acquire or requisition property for a public purpose should also satisfy the requirements of article 19 (1) (f).
The Bill seeks to surmount the difficulties placed in the way of giving effect to the Directive Principles of State Policy by the aforesaid interpretation.
It is also proposed to provide that article 19(1)(f) shall not apply to any law relating to the acquisition or requisitioning of property for a public purpose.
For this provision to apply in the case of laws made by State Legislatures, it is necessary that the relevant Bill should be reserved for the consideration of the President and receive his assent.
[5] Speaking in the Lok Sabha on 30 November, Gokhale commended the Bill, and stated that the intention of new article 31C was to give primacy to Directive Principles and limit property rights in a manner that "vested interests may not be able to take shelter under Fundamental Rights and block progressive legislations".
He also stated the judiciary would be confined to the task of legal interpretation of the Constitution, and not be called upon to "sit in judgment over political issues".
Gokhale complained that there was a tendency for judges to "import their own political philosophies into their judgements" and "sanctify the right of property".
Gokhale further added, "Parliament should remain the final arbiter in determining what is adequate or can be regarded as reasonable for acquisition under a particular legislation ... Social change should not be blocked by courts by making compulsory the payment of such a quantum of compensation as to make social change impossible."
"[1] The bill was trenchantly criticised by Piloo Mody of the Swatantra Party, who stated that India's secular and democratic Constitution was being converted into an instrument of a "totalitarian oligarchy devoid of the rule of law".
Supporting the Fundamental Rights, Ramamchandran wrote, "When our founding fathers forged this Constitution they were well aware of the social and economic urges in the country.
That is why they envisaged the rights to be fundamental in Part III subject to reasonable restrictions in public interest.