Despite a perception of resistance and even obstruction then by the bureaucracy in the War Department General Staff (WDGS), much of which was attributable to lack of funds, the Air Corps later made great strides in the 1930s, both organizationally and in doctrine.

Arnold's proposal was immediately opposed by the General Staff in all respects, rehashing its traditional doctrinal argument that, in the event of war, the Air Corps would have no mission independent of support of the ground forces.

[9] The likelihood of U.S. participation in World War II prompted the most radical reorganization of the aviation branch in its history, developing a structure that both unified command of all air elements and gave it total autonomy and equality with the ground forces by March 1942.

Less than five months after the rejection of Arnold's reorganization proposal, a joint U.S.-British strategic planning agreement (ABC-1) refuted the General Staff's argument that the Air Corps had no wartime mission except to support ground forces.

While this step was never officially recognized by the United States Navy, and was bitterly disputed behind the scenes at every opportunity, it nevertheless succeeded as a pragmatic foundation for the future separation of the Air Force.

The concept of an "operating staff", or directorates, was modeled on the RAF system that had been much admired by the observer groups sent over in 1941, and resulted from a desire to place experts in various aspects of military aviation into key positions of implementation.

The system of directorates in particular handicapped the developing operational training program (see Combat units below), preventing establishment of an OTU command and having a tendency to micromanage because of the lack of centralized control.

[30] Four main directorates—Military Requirements, Technical Services, Personnel, and Management Control—were created, each with multiple sub-directorates, and eventually more than thirty offices were authorized to issue orders in the name of the commanding general.

The policy functions of the directorates were reorganized and consolidated into offices regrouped along conventional military lines under six assistant chiefs of air staff (AC/AS): Personnel; Intelligence; Operations, Commitments, and Requirements (OC&R); Materiel, Maintenance, and Distribution (MM&D);[n 10] Plans; and Training.

RAF crews he interviewed said that by spring 1941 a fighter engaging Germans had to have the capability to reach 400 mph in speed, fight at 30,000–35,000 feet, be simple to take off, provide armor for the pilot, and carry 12 machine guns or six cannons, all attributes lacking in American aircraft.

The process was driven by the pace of aircraft production, not the training program,[43] and was ably aided by the direction of Lovett, who for all practical purposes became "Secretary of the Air Corps".

[44][n 15] A lawyer and a banker, Lovett had prior experience with the aviation industry that translated into realistic production goals and harmony in integrating the plans of the AAF with those of the Army as a whole.

The need for large numbers of specialists in administration and technical services resulted in the establishment of an Officer Candidate School in Miami Beach, Florida, and the direct commissioning of thousands of professionals.

[58] In 1940, pressured by Eleanor Roosevelt and some Northern members of Congress, General Arnold agreed to accept blacks for pilot training, albeit on a segregated basis.

Most of the wings of World War II, however, were composed of groups with like functions (denoted as bombardment, fighter, reconnaissance, training, antisubmarine, troop carrier, and replacement).

Spaatz, last commanding general of the AFCC, was temporarily given supervisory responsibility for OTU while the new directorates were brought up to speed,[91] but after April 1942 the sub-directorates having jurisdiction over the training[n 45] tended to tell the air forces not only what to do, but how to do it.

The B-17 bomber command of the U.S. Eighth Air Force had only flown six relatively unopposed missions when AWPD/42 was drawn up, and the prior mistake in AWPD/1 of disregarding the need and feasibility of long-range fighter escorts was repeated.

On 1 July 1942 the War Department first set a one-year tour of duty for all AAF combat crews, but a simple, uniform policy service-wide was unrealistic and never put into effect.

[111] After studying the situation, the War Department rescinded the one-year tour policy on 29 May 1943 and changed procedures for assignment of replacements to include both attrition and rotation purposes.

Arnold began to build reserves in tactical units to provide enough personnel for multiple crews for each aircraft but was hampered by the rotation policies, particularly among those fighting in Europe.

The AAF approved in April 1944 the use of 30 days leave in the United States on a limited basis as a substitute for rotation but by August found it counterproductive for rehabilitative purposes.

[115] In September 1944 Arnold, without rescinding his "no fixed tours" order, notified field commands that his objective was to provide enough replacement crews that rotation "based on war weariness" became unnecessary.

After a slow and often costly effort to bring the necessary strength to bear, joined in 1944 by the Fifteenth Air Force stationed in Italy, strategic bombing finally began to get results, and by the end of the war, the German economy had been dispersed and pounded to rubble.

Though far from providing the initial impulse, the President's message of 19 December 1945 contributed considerable impetus to a series of developments within the executive and legislative branches of the government which led directly, if belatedly, to the adoption of the National Security Act of 1947.

Earl McClendon, Autonomy of the Air Arm[128] On 11 April 1945, at the conclusion of a ten-month study that took them to every major theater to interview 80 "key military and naval personnel", the Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Committee for the Reorganization of National Defense recommended that the armed forces of United States be organized into a single cabinet department, and that "three coordinate combat branches, Army, Navy, and Air" comprise the operational services.

The committee also reported that its recommendation was approved by "Generals of the Army Douglas MacArthur and Dwight D. Eisenhower, Fleet Admirals Chester W. Nimitz and William F. Halsey and numerous other leading military and naval personnel".

Made of seal brown horsehide leather (later supplemented by goatskin) with a beige spun silk lining (cotton after 1939), the jackets featured an officer's stand-up collar, shoulder straps, knit waistbands and cuffs, a zipper closing, and unit insignia.

The AAF standardized the sage green or light olive drab B-10 flight jacket on 22 July 1943, accompanied by matching A-9 flying trousers with built-in suspenders, and the combination became widespread in the Eighth Air Force by early 1944.

To denote the special training and qualifications required for air crew and technical personnel in the USAAF, in most categories known as being rated, the following military badges (known familiarly but ubiquitously throughout the service as "wings") were authorized for wear by members of the Army Air Forces:[153] These aviation qualification badges were typically worn in full three-inch (76 mm) size on service or dress uniforms, but two-inch versions (nicknamed "sweetheart wings") were also authorized for less-formal shirt wear.

In order to recognize and differentiate combat aircrews from other airmen in Europe, on 29 March 1943 the European Theater Headquarters of the U.S. Army created an ultramarine blue cloth patch 1" × 3.25" to be sewn on the service coat behind the aviation badge.