[10] Fearing for his personal safety and less confident in his charismatic abilities to diffuse the growing tension, Amin began withdrawing from the public sphere and conducting fewer visits with his troops.

[17] According to Amin's son, Jaffar Remo, rumours of a potential Tanzanian invasion led members of the Ugandan high command to call for a preemptive attack on Tanzania.

[18] The Tanzanian military later argued that Amin's ultimate aim was to annex a large part of northern Tanzania, including the city of Tanga, in order to gain access to the sea for trading purposes.

[19] Several other Uganda Army officers have offered more mundane explanations for the invasion, according to which isolated conflicts along the border resulted in a spiral of violence that culminated in open warfare.

[23] According to American journalists Tony Avirgan and Martha Honey, the bar incident occurred on 22 October, when a drunken Ugandan intelligence officer was shot and killed by Tanzanian soldiers after firing on them.

[29] Researchers Andrew Mambo and Julian Schofield discounted this theory as unlikely, noting that the battalions that are said to have mutinied remained relatively loyal to Amin's cause throughout the war, and instead supported the notion that Butabika escalated a dispute at the border into an invasion.

At the same time, Radio Uganda's Kinyankole language broadcasts—which were closely monitored and understood by West Lake residents—virulently criticised Nyerere and claimed that Tanzanians wished to fall under Ugandan jurisdiction to escape the former's rule.

[40] Commanded by Uganda Army Chief of Staff Yusuf Gowon[20] and equipped with tanks and APCs, they only faced ineffectual rifle fire from several dozen members of the Tanzania People's Militia.

"[46] Six African leaders condemned the invasion of Kagera as Ugandan aggression: Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia, Didier Ratsiraka of Madagascar, Agostinho Neto of Angola, Seretse Khama of Botswana, Samora Machel of Mozambique, and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia.

TPDF Chief of Staff Major General Tumainie Kiwelu took command of the troops, and the Tanzanians initiated a heavy artillery bombardment of the northern bank, triggering the flight of many Uganda Army soldiers.

[58] On 14 November Amin, sensing that other African states did not support his position and irrationally fearing that the Soviet Union was about to give Tanzania new weapons, declared the unconditional withdrawal of all Ugandan troops from Kagera and invited OAU observers to witness it.

[107] Whereas Kikosi Maalum and FRONASA contributed frontline troops and guerrillas that acted as auxiliaries and scouts to the TPDF,[107] SUM conducted bombings and raids to destabilise Amin's regime from within.

Chairman Yasser Arafat, and top aides Khalil al-Wazir and Saad Sayel discussed their options, and resolved to send more PLO forces to Uganda in order to protect Amin's regime.

According to researcher Alicia C. Decker, the deserters' behaviour was not just motivated by the collapse of discipline, but also strategic considerations: by spreading chaos and causing civilians to flee, they gained better cover for their own retreat.

Though he felt that after the Libyan intervention at Lukaya it was no longer possible to count on the Ugandan rebels being able to capture Kampala by themselves, he believed that it was highly important they should be given time to organise their own government to succeed Amin.

According to Indian diplomat Madanjeet Singh, Uganda Army soldiers began killing Ugandan and expatriate civilians at random after the war started, and within the month of February 1979 over 500 people were murdered.

[224] Sociologist Ronald Aminzade asserted that "the key" to Tanzania's victory was its ideological framing of the war as a threat to the nation, thus facilitating the mobilisation of a popular militia that performed well in combat.

[230] Journalist Godwin Matatu reasoned that the Uganda Army's failures rested on its low morale and reliance on vehicles and roads which made them vulnerable to Tanzanian ground forces, who travelled on foot for much of the war.

[88] Venter instead claimed that the TPDF had "the edge" due to an effective sabotage campaign waged by the Save Uganda Movement as well as the "lackluster ability of Amin's main counter-strike force".

[239] For its own part, the Tanzanian government accused Amin of committing atrocities against his people and stressed that many Ugandans "celebrated" Tanzania's invasion, but it did not justify the war on humanitarian grounds.

Acheson-Brown also noted that the Uganda Army committed "an overwhelming number of atrocities" during the conflict and that Tanzania made "some significant violations of the proper conduct of war", particularly when the TPDF destroyed Mutukula.

[188] At an OAU conference in July 1979, President Gaafar Nimeiry of Sudan said that the Uganda–Tanzania War had set a "serious precedent" and noted that the organisation's charter "prohibits interference in other people's internal affairs and invasion of their territory by armed force.

Nyerere accused the OAU of shielding black African leaders from criticism, noting that Amin's regime had killed more people than the white minority governments in southern Africa.

[247] He also circulated a "Blue Book" published by the Tanzanian government, which argued that Tanzania's role in the war was justified by Uganda's attack on the Kagera Salient and Libya's armed intervention, which would have prevented the Ugandan rebels from overthrowing Amin themselves.

[250] The movement of armed forces throughout Uganda in 1979 disrupted the planting season, leading to inflated prices for staple crops such as bananas, sweet potatoes, and cassava, and causing famine in some regions.

Nyerere stated in January 1979 that the TPDF operation to expel the Ugandans had necessitated a "tremendous" diversion of the country's resources away from development work, and he estimated that the war took $1 million a day to finance.

Some in the military hierarchy expressed disapproval in light of Tanzania's bleak financial situation, and the country's depressed economy eventually forced the TPDF to disband many of the extra units.

[2][286] The mobilisation of tens of thousands of soldiers had a major impact on Tanzania's society, as many young men from poorer families had enjoyed the power, chance of plunder, and relatively good salaries of military life.

[292] Nyerere, Tanzanian Vice President Aboud Jumbe, Prime Minister Sokoine, Chief of Defence Forces Abdallah Twalipo, and Chama Cha Mapinduzi Executive Secretary Pius Msekwa visited the monument on 26 July 1979 to pay their respects to the dead soldiers.

[294] Nyerere toured Tabora, Arusha, Mtwara, Bukoba, Mwanza, Tanga, Zanzibar, Iringa, Dodoma, Dar es Salaam, and Mara to thank the Tanzanian population for its contributions to the war effort.