It was massively expanded and modernized, mostly with weaponry of Eastern Bloc origin, though Uganda's difficult international relations resulted in shortcomings in the supply of spare parts.

[4][7] Over the course of the Mengo Crisis of 1966, Prime Minister Milton Obote and his protégé, Uganda Army commander Idi Amin, used the military to oust the country's president, Mutesa II of Buganda, and establish a de facto dictatorship.

[8][9] This event marked the full entry of the military into the political arena,[10] and the start of ethnic purges in the Uganda Army, as many Bantu and Teso troops were ousted from the ranks.

Obote feared that the Uganda Army had become too dominated by West Nile tribesmen who were regarded as partisans of Idi Amin, and reacted by ordering the recruitment of more Langi and Acholi.

[20] The coup created unrest in the Uganda Army, as tensions rose between the pre-existing Acholi and Langi-dominated hierarchy and the new command structure consisting of the junior officers who had supported Amin's takeover.

[31] The Ugandan government maintained that pro-Obote guerrillas had attacked the barracks,[32] whereas a pro-opposition source stated that the fighting had erupted due to tribal rivalries and 900 Acholi as well as Lango troops being massacred by Amin's supporters.

[36] In order to replace the purged troops and consolidate his power, Amin enlisted tribesmen belonging to ethnic groups that lived in the West Nile District, Sudan, Zaire,[37] Kenya,[38] and Rwanda.

[48] Amin also wielded the army as the country's main arm of law enforcement, which facilitated soldiers' abuse of power over civilians and subverted the authority of the police and non-military institutions.

The First Sudanese Civil War had ended in March 1972, and many Anyanya rebels opted to cross the border and enlist in the Uganda Army instead of remaining in their home country.

[40] The army also proved incapable of containing incursions from Turkana cattle raiders from Kenya, though on several occasions they crossed the border in pursuit and carried out reprisals on Kenyans both there and in Uganda.

[70] Around August 1976, the Uganda Army experienced another purge,[71] while rogue troops went on an ethnically charged rampage in Jinja and Makerere, killing or expelling all Kenyans they could find.

Amin consequently purged Adrisi's loyalists from the military,[86][87] including chief of staff Isaac Lumago and other ranking officers such as Moses Ali,[87] Juma Oris,[88] and Nasur Ezega.

[94] Researcher Aiden Southall argued that by this point Ugandan soldiers had been increasingly substituted by "Sudanese and Zairois guerrillas and mercenaries",[93] while Paul Nugent said that this development "amounted to the disappearance of a national army in the conventional sense of the term.

[99] The New York Times reporter John Darnton pieced together several accounts by refugees, and argued that the invasion was possibly part of an elaborate plan by Amin.

[112] The ability of the Uganda Army's ground forces to resist the TPDF was hampered by organizational chaos, indiscipline, and the widespread lack of combat experience among its troops.

[98] Well equipped with armoured personnel carriers, the Ugandan soldiers usually chose to fight along the country's roads, but deployed their vehicles ineffectively against well-armed Tanzanian troops, resulting in many losses.

[126] This article is part of a series aboutIdi Amin Military career President of Uganda(1971–1979) Opposition and overthrow Media portrayals Thousands or even tens of thousands[129] of Uganda Army troops managed to flee across the borders to Zaire and Sudan, however, where they reorganized as insurgents and rallied[123] under the leadership of officers such as Emilio Mondo, Isaac Lumago, Isaac Maliyamungu,[130] Elly Hassan,[131] Christopher Mawadri,[130][132] and Moses Ali.

In August 1985, FUNA leader Isaac Lumago even claimed that the "structure of the army that went into exile after Amin's overthrow remains intact in southern Sudan and eastern Zaire".

[3] When the NRA advanced into the West Nile region, the local elders convinced most ex-Uganda Army soldiers to peacefully surrender and reconcile with Museveni's government.

[146][147] Some militant Amin loyalists[148] and Uganda Army veterans such as Dusman Sabuni[149][150] eventually joined the Allied Democratic Forces that continue to wage an insurgency up until the present day.

Guarded by State Research Bureau agents, the planes brought coffee for sale to England, and returned to Uganda with alcohol, cigars, cars, various luxury items, and supplies for the military and police.

[163] Along with similar air services to the United States, the "whisky run" acted as "Amin's lifeline"[158] and won him a "shaky loyalty" among the military,[87] and especially among the officers who received most of the rewards.

Researcher Mark Leopold consequently described the West Nile soldiers during Amin's rule as "lumpen militariat", a term originally developed by Ali Mazrui based on the Marxist concept of Lumpenproletariat.

[183] Indian diplomat Madanjeet Singh wrote that Amin "had a cunning grasp of the tribal mentality, and shrewdly played upon intertribal and interreligious rivalries, quarrels and envy to control the army".

[67] Several high-ranking officers who were Christian or did not belong to the favored tribes also remained in the Uganda Army up until Amin's regime collapsed, with Ali Fadhul and Isaac Maliyamungu being notable examples.

[176] After the 1971 coup, Amin initially preferred to recruit and promote Kakwa, Nubians, Madi, Lugbara, and Alur,[38][40] while members of other ethnic groups were gradually removed from the Uganda Army, as they were suspected of being disloyal.

[192] As result of repeated coup attempts and other factors, the Lugbara, Madi, and Alur also came under suspicion and were partially purged by 1973,[56] leaving just the Kakwa and Nubians as core faction of the Uganda Army.

[187][41] According to researcher Holger Bernt Hansen, the mercenary role of the Sudanese recruits was especially evident as the Anyanya rebels had fought against Islamization in their home areas, yet supported Amin's regime that favored Muslims.

Most men called to serve on the panels were selected on the basis of their loyalty to the President and their willingness to convict political opponents of the regime; many were illiterate and had no understanding of Ugandan law.

[203] According to Cooper and Fontanellaz, the Uganda Army was at least nominally 19,000 soldiers strong by January 1976, of whom 658 were officers,[204] while the German newspaper Der Spiegel put its strength at 21,000 in 1977.