[8] Each post-independence regime expanded the size of the army, usually by recruiting from among people of one region or ethnic group, and each government employed military force to subdue political unrest.

[8] A series of similar clashes occurred between troops and demonstrators, and in March 1962 the government recognized the army's growing domestic importance by transferring control of the military to the Ministry of Home Affairs.

[8] Mutesa used his political power to protect the interests of his Baganda constituency and refused to support demands for Africanisation of the officer ranks.

[8] Within weeks of the mutiny, the president's cabinet also approved a military pay raise retroactive to 1 January 1964, more than doubling the salaries of those in private to staff-sergeant ranks.

When Congolese aircraft bombed the West Nile villages of Paidha and Goli on 13 February 1965, Obote again increased military recruitment and doubled the army's size to more than 4,500.

[18][19] On 24 May 1966, Obote ousted Mutesa, assumed his office as president and commander in chief, suspended the 1962 constitution, and consolidated his control over the military by eliminating several rivals.

[8] His small army contingent in 27 trucks set out to capture the southern Ugandan military post at Masaka but instead settled down to await a general uprising against Amin, which did not occur.

After the Uganda–Tanzania War, fighters available to the new government included only the fewer than 1,000 troops who had fought alongside the Tanzanian People's Defence Force (TPDF) to expel Amin.

But in 1979, in an attempt to consolidate support for the future, leaders such as Yoweri Museveni and Major General (later Chief of Staff) Ojok began to enroll thousands of recruits into what were rapidly becoming their private armies.

[8] When then-President Godfrey Binaisa sought to curb the use of these militias, which were harassing and detaining political opponents, he was overthrown in a military coup on 10 May 1980.

[8] The coup was engineered by Ojok, Museveni, and others acting under the general direction of Paulo Muwanga, Obote's right-hand man and chair of the Military Commission.

[8] The TPDF was still providing necessary security while Uganda's police force—which had been decimated by Amin—was rebuilt, but President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania refused to help Binaisa retain power.

[8] Many Ugandans claimed that although Nyerere did not impose his own choice on Uganda, he indirectly facilitated the return to power of his old friend and ally, Obote.

[8] In any case, the Military Commission headed by Muwanga effectively governed Uganda during the six months leading up to the national elections of December 1980.

[28] After the MRM victory steps were taken to institutionalize the NRA, including the setting-up of a bureaucracy; uniforms; regimental colours; training programmes; ranks; and pay and privileges.

Other Tutsi refugees were highly placed: Peter Baingana was head of NRA medical services and Chris Bunyenyezi was the commander of the 306th Brigade.

[30] Tutsi refugees formed a disproportionate number of NRA officers for the simple reason that they had joined the rebellion early and thus had accumulated more experience.

Somerville ascribes the budget rise to the rebellion in the north, Uganda's military intervention in the Congo, and "massive corruption" - 'ghost soldiers' who did not exist, whose (real) salaries were claimed by senior officers.

[33] UPDF's primary focus was the conflict with the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a rebel group operating in the country's northern region.

These raids, collectively known as Operation Iron Fist, have resulted in the repatriation of many abducted children being held by the rebels as child soldiers or sex slaves.

"Bancroft Global Development, headquartered on Washington's Embassy Row, employs about 40 South African and European trainers who work with [AMISOM's] Ugandan and Burundian troops.

"[47] Bancroft director Michael Stock told The EastAfrican that these mentors are embedded with AMISOM units in Mogadishu and southern and central Somalia.

An accompanying Mil Mi-17 transport helicopter landed without problems in the eastern Kenyan town of Garissa near the Somali border for a scheduled refuelling stop.

[48] In August 2014, AMISOM launched Operation Indian Ocean against al-Shabaab in Lower Shabelle and other coastal areas of southcentral Somalia.

[49] On 1 September 2014, a U.S. drone strike carried out as part of the broader mission killed Al-Shabaab leader Moktar Ali Zubeyr.

[57][58][59][60][61][62][needs update] In November 2011, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU) authorized a Regional Co-operation Initiative (RCI) for eliminating the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA).

The RCI was planned to consist of three elements: a Joint Co-ordination Mechanism chaired by the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security and made up of the Ministers of Defence of the four affected countries (Uganda, South Sudan, the DRC, and the CAR); a Regional Task Force Headquarters; and, the Regional Task Force (RTF) of up to 5,000 troops from the four countries.

By February 2013, the RTF had 3,350 soldiers and had finished deploying to the three sectors envisioned, with bases at Dungu, Obo, and Nzara (South Sudan).

As Uganda's government forged closer links with the Eastern Bloc, the UAAF began to acquire more aircraft as well as support in training from the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Libya.

[149] In 2011, Emmanuel Tumusiime-Mutebile, the central bank governor, caused large volatility in the Ugandan shilling when he told the Financial Times that President Museveni had ignored technical advice against using Uganda's small foreign exchange reserves to buy new Sukhoi Su-30 fighter aircraft.