[3] One estimate by the UN High Commissioner of Human Rights suggests that as many as 7% of the Hutus that fled to the Congo were members of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), the rebel group responsible for the genocide.

Estimates from the International Rescue Committee suggest that fewer than 10 percent of victims of these conflict deaths were soldiers killed in direct combat.

[8] Unfortunately, while the mission was successful in some regards, it received widespread criticism for its failure to take direct action against the rebel groups deemed responsible for the war and violence.

For example, beginning 14 May 2002, the Rwandan-backed Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) rebel movement engaged in “widespread killings, summary executions, rapes, and pillage” in the northern town of Kisangani.

[10] In response to criticisms regarding the UN's failure to act in such events, the UN added “stabilisation” to the MONUC mandate, thereby reestablishing the peacekeeping operation as MONUSCO in 2010.

[12] The concept of the Force Intervention Brigade was first introduced at the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), during which the failures of MONUSCO to end violence in the eastern Congo were highlighted and addressed.

In response to these concerns, Uganda, with the support of South Africa, proposed the establishment of the Neutral Intervention Brigade, a small offensive force composed of troops from countries in the region.

Ultimately authorized after 14 years of MONUSCO presence in the Congo, the Force Intervention Brigade was embraced as a radical change in UN efforts to “break the persistent cycles of violence in DRC,” and as a shift away from traditional peacekeeping and towards peace enforcement.

In support of the authorities of the DRC, on the basis of information collation and analysis, and taking full account of the need to protect civilians and mitigate risk before, during and after any military operation, carry out targeted offensive operations through the Intervention Brigade... either unilaterally or jointly with the FARDC, in a robust, highly mobile and versatile manner and in strict compliance with international law, including international humanitarian law and with the human rights due diligence policy on UN-support to non-UN forces (HRDDP), to prevent the expansion of all armed groups, neutralize these groups, and to disarm them in order to contribute to the objective of reducing the threat posed by armed groups on state authority and civilian security in eastern DRC and to make space for stabilization activities.

[16] Although there have been cases of conflict-related violence across the country, rebel presence in the east is especially prevalent, especially due to its proximity to the Rwandan border.

Many reports suggest that these rebel groups are funding their activities by exploiting the mineral-rich land in the eastern Congo and by participating in the mineral smuggling trade.

The representative of the Russian Federation suggested that the situation in the Congo is so complex and so urgent that a reduction in military personnel could not be justified.

[citation needed] In August 2013, Near the Triple Towers area, near Kibati, a South African sniper took the then 6th longest shot in history, 2,125 metres (6,972 ft).

By March, 2014, it was MONUSCO forces the ones who assisted the FARDC, not the FIB, in conducting operations in a triangle formed between the axis of Beni, Kamango and the eastern boundary with South Irumu.

The Force Intervention Brigade acted in this situation to destroy the bases of the ADF, and it was considered largely successful in this regard.

In December 2014, media reports supported Human Rights Watch' contentions about massacres in the Beni, North Kivu region.

[42] Large-scale rebel attacks occurring nearly weekly have terrorized residents of Beni and left them uncertain where to seek safety.

Furthermore, scholars warn that the implementation of the Force Intervention Brigade under the larger MONUSCO mandate may be blurring the line between peace enforcement and peacekeeping.

[57] As a result, rebel groups may begin to target UN peacekeeping officials as well as humanitarian aid workers, even those who are not involved in the Force Intervention Brigade component of the MONUSCO mission.

The March 2018 UN investigation report of the Beni attack highlighted the need for better regional coordination and improvements[89] in command determination and initiative.