[29][30][31][32] Although the two countries fought to a standoff, the conflict is seen as a strategic and political defeat for Pakistan,[33][23][34][35][36][37][38] as it had not succeeded in fomenting an insurrection in Kashmir and was instead forced to shift gears in the defence of Lahore.

Although the Kashmir conflict was the predominant issue dividing the nations, other border disputes existed, most notably over the Rann of Kutch, a barren region in the Indian state of Gujarat.

[61] Indian forces, tipped off by the local populace, captured several Pakistani soldiers who revealed that Pakistan was attempting to ignite the resistance movement employing a covert infiltration, code-named Operation Gibraltar.

[61] Indian Army crossed the cease fire line on 15 August and captured several previously infiltrated peaks overlooking the Srinagar – Leh Highway.

Wishing to stop the influx of Pakistani forces into the Uri-Poonch bulge, COAS Jayanto Nath Chaudhuri commanded the XV Corps under Lt Gen K. S. Katoch to advance and take over Haji Pir pass.

[65] On 1 September 1965, Pakistan launched a counterattack, called Operation Grand Slam, with the objective to capture the vital town of Akhnoor in Jammu, which would sever communications and cut off supply routes to Indian troops.

[70] Attacking with an overwhelming ratio of troops and technically superior tanks, Pakistan made gains against Indian forces under the command of Maj Gen A. H. Malik, who were caught unprepared and suffered heavy losses.

[77] The thrust against Lahore consisted of the 1st Infantry Division supported by the three tank regiments of the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade; they quickly advanced across the border, reaching the Ichhogil (BRB) Canal by 6 September.

[80] On 8 September 1965, a company of five Maratha Light Infantry was sent to reinforce a Rajasthan Armed Constabulary (RAC) post at Munabao – a strategic hamlet about 250 kilometers from Jodhpur.

[citation needed] The IAF was flying large numbers of Hawker Hunters, Indian-manufactured Folland Gnats, de Havilland Vampires, EE Canberra bombers and a squadron of MiG-21s.

An IAF Gnat, piloted by Squadron Leader Brij Pal Singh Sikand, landed at an abandoned Pakistani airstrip at Pasrur, as he lacked the fuel to return to his base, and was captured by the Pakistan Army.

Sqn Ldr Saad Hatmi who flew the captured aircraft to Sargodha, and later tested and evaluated its flight performance, presumed that Gnat was no "Sabre Slayer" when it came to dog fighting.

[120] Indian sources have pointed out that, despite PAF claims of losing only a squadron of combat craft, Pakistan sought to acquire additional aircraft from Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and China within 10 days of the beginning of the war.

[151] Only 22 commandos returned to Pakistan as planned, 93 were taken prisoner (including one of the Commanders of the operations, Major Khalid Butt), and 20 were killed in encounters with the army, police, or civilians.

In three weeks, the second Indo-Pak War ended in what appeared to be a draw when the embargo placed by Washington on U.S. ammunition and replacements for both armies forced the cessation of conflict before either side won a clear victory.

India, however, was in a position to inflict grave damage to, if not capture, Pakistan's capital of the Punjab when the cease-fire was called, and controlled Kashmir's strategic Uri-Poonch bulge, much to Ayub's chagrin.

A brief, but furious 1965 war with India began with a covert Pakistani thrust across the Kashmiri cease-fire line and ended up with the city of Lahore threatened with encirclement by the Indian Army.

Pakistan made gains in the Rajasthan desert, but its main push against India's Jammu-Srinagar road link was repulsed, and Indian tanks advanced to within a sight of Lahore.

[188] In addition to the expected exchange of small arms and artillery fire, India reported that Pakistan used the ceasefire to capture the Indian village of Chananwalla in the Fazilka sector.

[192] Pakistan State's reports had suggested that their military was performing admirably in the war – which they incorrectly blamed as being initiated by India – and thus the Tashkent Declaration was seen as having forfeited the gains.

During the replacement, a 24-hour pause was observed, enabling the Indian army to regroup in Akhnoor and successfully repel a sluggish assault led by General Yahya Khan.

"[203] During the war, the Pakistani Air Marshal and Commander-in-Chief of PAF, Nur Khan, later stated that it is the Pakistan Army that should be held accountable for initiating the conflict, rather than India.

[213][214][215] Iran and Turkey issued a joint communiqué on 10 September which placed the blame on India, backed the United Nations' appeal for a cease-fire and offered to deploy troops for a UN peacekeeping mission in Kashmir.

[215] International opinion considered China's actions to be dangerously reckless and aggressive, and it was soundly rebuked in the world press for its unnecessarily provocative stance during the conflict.

Major improvements were also made in command and control to address various shortcomings and the positive impact of these changes was clearly visible during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 when India achieved a decisive victory over Pakistan within two weeks.

[243][244] Rasul Bux Rais, a Pakistani political analyst wrote[245] – The 1965 war with India proved that Pakistan could neither break the formidable Indian defenses in an intense violent military campaign fashion nor could she sustain an all-out conflict for long.

[246] The Pakistani air force, on the other hand, racked up considerable acclaim and esteem among the military and international warfare critics for its defence of Lahore and other crucial parts of the country and its hefty retaliation against India the day afterward.

Ayub Khan had espoused high expectations among the Pakistani populace regarding the superiority,  if not invincibility,  of its armed forces,[249] in accordance with the guidance of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the foreign minister of Pakistan.

[255] Chairman joint chiefs General Tariq Majid claims in his memoirs that Zhou Enlai had long advised the government in the classic style of Sun Tzu: "to go slow, not to push India hard, and avoid a fight over Kashmir, 'for at least, 20–30 years, until you have developed your economy and consolidated your national power'.

"[255] General Majid maintained in Eating Grass that the "sane, philosophical and political critical thinking" was missing in Pakistan, and that the country had lost extensive human resources by fighting the war.