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In two cases docketed for argument on November 13, 2003, the sex offender registries of two states, Alaska and Connecticut, would face legal challenge.
The constitutionality of the registries was challenged in two ways: In Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003), the Supreme Court upheld Alaska's sex-offender registration statute.
Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen Breyer dissented.
However, On July 25, 2008, Doe number two prevailed and the Alaska Supreme Court ruled that the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act's registration violated the ex post facto clause of the state's constitution and ruled that the requirement does not apply to persons who committed their crimes before the act became effective on August 10, 1994.
of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1 (2003),[2] the Court ruled that Connecticut's sex-offender registration statute did not violate the procedural due process of those to whom it applied, although the Court "expresses no opinion as to whether the State's law violates substantive due process principles."
[9] On remand, the Jackson County Circuit Court entered an injunction ordering that the applicable individuals be removed from the published sex offender list.
[13] As a result, the decisions of the Missouri courts prohibiting the retrospective application of sex offender laws remained intact.
On January 12, 2010, Cole County Circuit Judge Richard Callahan ruled that individuals who plead guilty to a sex offense are not required to register under Federal Law and thus are not required to register in Missouri if the date of their plea was prior to the passage of the Missouri registration law.
[15] Missouri also has a number of laws that restrict the activities of persons required to register as sex offenders, several of which have also been challenged as being retrospective in their operation.
On February 19, 2008, the Supreme Court of Missouri held that a law prohibiting registered sex offenders from residing within 1,000 feet of a school was retrospective in operation as applied to registered sex offenders who had resided at a location within such a distance prior to the enactment of the law.