United States biological defense program

In 1951, due to biological warfare concerns arising from the Korean War, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) created the Epidemic Intelligence Service (EIS), a hands-on two-year postgraduate training program in epidemiology, with a focus on field work.

Since the 2001 anthrax attacks, and the consequent expansion of federal bio-defense expenditures, USAMRIID has been joined at Fort Detrick by sister bio-defense agencies of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (NIAID's Integrated Research Facility) and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center and the National Bioforensic Analysis Center).

Most research and development was done at Fort Detrick, Maryland, while production and testing of bio-weapons occurred at Pine Bluff, Arkansas, and Dugway Proving Ground (DPG), Utah.

[8] In October 1950, the US Secretary of Defense approved continuation of the program, based largely on the Soviet threat and a belief that the North Korean and Chinese communists would use biological weapons.

One of the Unit's first missions was to manage all aspects of Project CD-22, the exposure of volunteers to aerosols containing a pathogenic strain of Coxiella burnetii, the etiologic agent of Q fever.

In the following decade, the US accumulated significant data on personnel protection, decontamination, and immunization; and, in the offensive program, on the potential for mosquitoes to be used as biological vectors.

During the last 10 years of the offensive research and development program (1959–69), many scientific advances were made that proved that biological warfare was clearly feasible, although dependent on careful planning, especially with regard to meteorological conditions.

Furthermore, modern principles of biosafety and containment were established at the Fort Detrick laboratories which have greatly facilitated biomedical research in general; still today, these are followed throughout the world.

Arnold G. Wedum, M.D., Ph.D., a civilian scientist who was Director of Industrial Health and Safety at Fort Detrick, was the leader in the development of containment facilities.

[19] Following Nixon's November 1969 order, scientists at Fort Detrick worked on one toxin, Staphylococcus enterotoxin type B (SEB), for several more months.

[12] Questions arose over the safety of the employees and the surrounding communities, and a suggestion was even made to shift all biological defense research to a civilian agency, such as the National Institutes of Health.

There were no patient-care category analogous to BSL-3; humans who are ill as a result of exposure to BSL-3 agents were to be cared for in an ordinary hospital room with barrier nursing procedures.

[10] USAMRIID guidelines were prepared to determine which level of containment would be employed for individual patients who required BSL-4 isolation or barrier nursing care.

Staff augmentation for BSL-4 critical care expertise came from the Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC), Washington, D.C., in accordance with a memorandum of agreement between the two institutions.

Led by a physician and a registered nurse, each of the two teams consisted of eight volunteers who trained intensively to provide an evacuation capability for casualties suspected of being infected with highly transmissible, life-threatening BSL-4 infectious diseases (e.g., hemorrhagic fever viruses).

During the 1995 outbreak of Ebola fever in Zaire, the AIT remained on alert to evacuate any US citizens who might have become ill while working to control the disease in that country.

In the US national interest, DTRA supports projects at more than 14 locations around the world, including Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Ukraine.

(The projects were undertaken between 1997 and 2000 and focused on the concern that the old Soviet BW program was secretly continuing and had developed a genetically modified anthrax weapon.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention administers the SAP, which regulates the laboratories that may possess, use, or transfer Select Agents within the United States.

First, Project BioShield authorizes $5.6 billion over 10 years for the government to purchase and stockpile vaccines and drugs to fight anthrax, smallpox and other potential agents of bioterror.

Under Project BioShield, HHS is moving forward with plans to acquire a safer, second generation smallpox vaccine, an antidote to botulinum toxin, and better treatments for exposure to chemical and radiological weapons.

In December 2019, Congress moved forward with a spending package that provided increases for several key U.S. biological defense programs, including the Strategic National Stockpile.

The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention was slated to receive $8 billion, a $636 million increase over 2019, with a mandate written in the bill for CDC "to maintain a strong and central role in the medical countermeasures enterprise."

Another change was a specific item in the budget for the Strategic National Stockpile, which directed $535 million for vaccines, medicines and diagnostic tools to fight Ebola, which has become an emerging threat.

[29] In August 2019, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report that identified specific challenges that the United States faces in protecting the nation against biological events.

The report focused on four specific vulnerabilities: assessment of "enterprise-wide threats", situational awareness and data integration, biodetection technologies, and lab safety and security.

[30][31] Products currently being produced or under development through military research include: Some vaccines also have applicability for diseases of domestic animals (e.g., Rift Valley fever and Venezuelan equine encephalitis).

In addition, vaccines are provided to persons who may be occupationally exposed to such agents (e.g., laboratory workers, entomologists, and veterinary personnel) throughout government, industry, and academe.

Examples of assistance rendered to civilian health efforts by the U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command (USAMRMC) include: The current[when?]

research effort combines new technological advances, such as genetic engineering and molecular modeling, applying them toward development of prevention and treatment of diseases of military significance.