United States constitutional criminal procedure

Petit jury and venue provisions—both traceable to enumerated complaints in the Declaration of Independence—are included in Article Three of the United States Constitution.

More criminal procedure provisions are contained in the United States Bill of Rights, specifically the Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Amendments.

First, the Court's decision in Barron v. Baltimore (1833) meant that the federal constitution did not apply in state proceedings until the incorporation of the Bill of Rights after the Fourteenth Amendment.

[8] Similarly, the Marshall Court discussed the level of detail required for a sufficient indictment without explicitly citing the Information Clause of the Sixth Amendment.

VIII provides: Stack v. Boyle (1951) is the only case in which the Supreme Court has held the bail imposed to have been constitutionally excessive.

[19] In Hurtado v. California (1884), the Supreme Court held that the Grand Jury Clause was not incorporated to apply to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.

In United States v. Williams (1992), where the Court rejected a rule that would have required "substantial exculpatory evidence" to be presented to the grand jury, the defendant did not even argue a Fifth Amendment violation.

In cases not required to be submitted to a grand jury, the formal charging instrument is referred to as an "information" (in the federal system and in some states) or a "complaint."

[33] Applying Barker, the Court found such a violation in Doggett v. United States (1992), which involved an over eight-year period between indictment and arrest.

VI provides: The Compulsory Process Clause guarantees the defendant the right to obtain favorable witnesses at trial.

VI provides: In Crawford v. Washington (2004), the Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause bars the "admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial" unless pursuant to one of the "exceptions established at the time of the founding.

"[46] "[W]hen the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements .

"[49] But, Crawford held that, "[w]hatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.

VI provides: One of the enumerated complaints in the Declaration of Independence accused King George III of "depriving us, in many Cases, of the Benefits of Trial by Jury.

[59] But, the defendant does not have a right to a jury in stacked misdemeanor prosecutions, even if the cumulative authorized imprisonment exceeds six months, as long as the actual sentence does not.

[60] Factors other than actual and authorized sentences may be relevant to seriousness, but so far the Court has pushed back against expanding the jury right.

[63] In some circumstances, the Sixth Amendment even requires the trial judge to grant a defendant's change of venue motion if an impartial jury cannot be obtained otherwise.

[69] In Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. ___ (2020), the Supreme Court overturned Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972), and held that all jury verdicts resulting in a conviction must be unanimous.

VI provides: The defendant has a right to have the courtroom open to the public, absent a showing of a substantial government interest that cannot be addressed by alternatives other than closure.

[103] Blockburger is the default rule, unless the legislatively intends to depart; for example, Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) may be punished separately from its predicates,[104] as can conspiracy.

[135] To satisfy the prejudice prong of Strickland, a defendant who rejects the prosecution's plea offer must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the offer would have been accepted by the defendant, not withdrawn by the prosecution, and accepted by the court, and that the sentence actually received exceeded that which would have been received under the plea.

[136] In Faretta v. California (1975), the Court held that a criminal defendant has the right to knowingly and voluntarily opt for pro se representation at trial.

XIV, § 1 provides: The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments apply generally to all stages of criminal proceedings.

Due process is also the catchall vehicle for the enforcement of fundamental fairness, even if the infirmities of a given prosecution do not neatly sound in another enumerated provision.

In re Winship (1970) explicitly held that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.

[147] The reasonable doubt standard is primarily effectuated by jury instructions, but it retains its relevance when the trial judge considers a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal and when an appellate court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence.

"It has long been accepted that a person whose mental condition is such that he lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his defense may not be subjected to a trial" consistent with the Due Process Clause.

The defendant may move to dismiss a criminal charge on the ground that he or she has been singled out for prosecution because of race, gender, religion, national origin, illegitimacy, or similar.

In the landmark case of Batson v. Kentucky (1986), the Supreme Court reversed a criminal conviction because of the prosecutor's racially motivated use of peremptory challenges.

[175] If the trial judge erroneously permits the striking of a juror under Batson, and the error is preserved, the only remedy is automatic reversal.