United States security assistance to the Palestinian National Authority

Additionally, though concerns about inadequate police equipment, training, and resources were paramount to the PLO and Arafat, international actors did not emphasize this component of their overall efforts to support the Oslo agreements.

[5] Aside from the official police and security sector discussions, the U.S. was undertaking some independent training and equipment donations, though the programs—mainly organized by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—were not explicitly detailed to the international community.

[6] In January 1994 media sources reported that PLO officials and bodyguards were traveling to the U.S. to receive training as a result of an agreement between Arafat and U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher.

[10] In her November 13, 2000 piece in The New York Times, Elaine Sciolino outlined four years of covert programming undertaken by the CIA from 1996—2000 with involvement at the most senior levels, including work by Director George Tenet.

Soon afterward, Mr. Clinton signed a presidential order creating a covert program to provide tens of millions of dollars to increase the professionalism of the Palestinian security services and help combat terrorism, the officials said.

She mentions in the same article that Tenet was asked to make a direct plea to Arafat to encourage the PA president to accept the terms of the July 2000 Camp David Summit but he was unsuccessful.

[13] Israeli troops reoccupied areas formerly under PA rule and added hundreds of roadblocks and checkpoints throughout the territories and began the construction of a controversial barrier along the entire length of the West Bank, which was justified by Israel as a necessary security measure but described by Palestinians as an effort to take away their land.

[18] A Palestinian–International Transitional Security Planning Team (TSPT) was formed in April 2005 as a joint effort between the PA Minister of the Interior General Nasser Youssef, and Lt. Gen. Kip Ward.

A news article from The Christian Science Monitor in May 2007 described the tension like this: That policy puts the U.S. and Israel on a highly unusual course in the history of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict: Four-square support for Fatah to contain, if not defeat, the growing power of Hamas, which won the Palestinian Authority's (PA) last election.

But whether the effort will succeed is far from certain, and some analysts say there are risks to that course, chief among them the possibility of further fueling the internal Palestinian conflict, leading to deeper despair in the occupied territories and a PA less able to make the compromises on peace with Israel than it is today.

[22]According to Lt. Gen. Dayton, after the election, the USSC focused on coordinating international actors to boost the Gazan economy by training PA's Presidential Guard troops to oversee border crossings.

[20] The Peruvian diplomat Alvaro de Soto, who served as UN envoy to the Quartet, remarked in 2007 when he resigned from his post, that the U.S. actively opposed reconciliation and "'pushed for a confrontation between Fatah and Hamas.

As Dayton put it, these steps are intended “to enforce the rule of law, and make [the PASF] accountable to the leadership of the Palestinian people whom they serve.” So far, however, progress on this front has been less even than the train-and-equip component and faced political pushback.

[20] According to Lt. Gen. Dayton in his seminal speech[29] on the subject to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy in May 2009 the mission of the USSC is: to coordinate various international donors under one plan of action that would eliminate duplication of effort.

[41] His original mandate to oversee PA security reform was shifted to a focus on preparing for Israel's unilateral disengagement plan from Gaza and certain West Bank settlements in August 2005.

According to his official military biography, immediately prior to this appointment, Moeller served as Director for Strategy, Plans and Policy for Headquarters U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).

In October 2017 he retired from the United States Armed Forces and assumed his current position as the Director of the William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies in February of 2018.

"[23] Trainees are typically around 20–22 years of age, and due to the prospect of steady employment, there has been a high demand for the training, leading USSC officials to believe that the recruits are "top notch.

The Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), the Israeli Police, the Jordanians, and the Palestinian Authority all check the names of recruits before they are permitted to take part in the training.

Dayton went on to explain, "upon the return of these new men of Palestine, they have shown motivation, discipline and professionalism, and they have made such a difference...."[23] The actual training of troops is the work of Jordanian Public Security Directorate police trainers who teach in Arabic.

[68] Lt. Gen. Dayton suggested in his 2009 policy speech that the PA response during Operation Cast Lead prevented a third intifada by using "a measured and disciplined approach to the popular unrest" and by keeping demonstrators away from Israelis.

"[61] Journalist Nathan Thrall characterized the same event as the most damaging to the Palestinian security forces' reputation, as the harsh reaction to protests and to Hamas sympathizers made the PASF seem like collaborators with the Israeli operation.

They write that the vetting process for recruits "has a clear political component," as attested to by an interviewee who stated that the NSF does not represent the whole society, such as those with inclinations towards Islamic groups of any sort have difficulty participating.

[71] Also, in response to claims of improvement in the PASF, the International Crisis Group raises the possibility of other factors, such as Israeli cooperation, playing a significant role in the performance of troops.

The Red Team report suggested that Fatah–Hamas reconciliation along with a renunciation of violence by Hamas would be necessary to help peace talks succeed and so they recommended working towards a unified Palestinian security force.

According to Perry, "CENTCOM's Red Team distances itself from the U.S. effort to provide training to the Fatah-controlled security forces in the West Bank, which began during George W. Bush's administration.

While that effort, currently headed by Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton, is not mentioned specifically in the report, the Red Team makes it clear that it believes that such initiatives will fail unless the Israelis and Palestinians negotiate an end to the conflict.

[75] He took issue with the restrictive travel policies that prevent U.S. employees from traversing the West Bank to see the situation firsthand, saying that the few official meetings do not allow the USSC to grasp the context or to develop "viable, not pie-in-the-sky, options to move forward.

[79] The PASF training program under Lt. Gen. Keith Dayton and the subsequent troop deployment in the West Bank have raised concerns among some Palestinians who accuse the NSF and the Presidential Guard of restricting civil liberties and violating human rights.

In "A Prescription for Civil War" by Jon Elmer, several Palestinians in the West Bank are interviewed and express their fears of being apprehended by security forces for their political leanings.