Criminal law in the Taney Court
"[9] In Ex parte Gordon (1861), the Court summarized its jurisdiction in federal criminal cases thus: [I]n criminal cases, the proceedings and judgment of the Circuit Court cannot be revised or controlled here, in any form of proceeding, either by writ of error or prohibition, and, consequently, we have no authority to examine them by a certiorari.
Pursuant to its power—under § 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789—to review the judgments of state courts on federal questions by writs of error, the Marshall Court had twice reversed criminal convictions obtained pursuant to a criminal statute that violated the federal constitution.
Article Four, Section Three, Clause Two of the Constitution provides that "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory".
[26] In In re Kaine (1852), by a 5-3 decision, the Court extended this holding under the 1848 extradition act which authorized commissions to play part of the role previously exercised by a district judge.
[27] In Ex parte Gordon (1861), the Court held that it had no original habeas jurisdiction to review a post-conviction sentence of death.
[4] The Marshall Court heard thirty-one criminal cases under the certificate of division procedure authorized by § 6 of the Judiciary Act of 1802.
[29] Prior to the Taney Court, no reported decision recorded an attempt by a party to obtain review in a criminal case by means of a prerogative writ other than habeas corpus.
[33] In United States v. Marigold (1850), the Court held that this was a Constitutional exercise of Congress's power to punish counterfeiting.
[35] In United States v. Rogers (1846), the Court held that the exception did not apply to defendants who were white persons who were adopted by Indians.
[37] Section 9 of the Crimes Act of 1825 prohibited removing goods from a wrecked ship "within the admiralty or maritime jurisdiction of the United States".
[38] In United States v. Coombs (1838), the Court held that the act did not extend to a defendant who had purloined several textile goods from a beached boat above the high tide line because there was no federal criminal admiralty jurisdiction beyond that point.
In Fox v. Ohio (1847) and Moore v. Illinois (1852), the Court reject the argument that the Double Jeopardy Clause was violated by permitting the state and federal government to criminalize the same conduct (which could hypothetically lead to duplicative prosecutions).
In United States v. Nickerson (1854), a federal case, the Court held that a second indictment after acquittal should be dismissed because of double jeopardy.
The statute at issue punished false statements on an application for a subsidy for cod fishing vessels.
[44] United States v. Dawson (1854) concerned a murder committed in the Indian Territory by a non-Indian defendant, a crime which by statute was triable in Arkansas.
"[46] In United States v. Jackalow (1861), the Court held that Article Three venue must be established by facts found by a jury.
An 1820 anti-piracy statute provided that, if the crime occurred on the high seas, venue was proper in the first state into which the defendant was brought after capture.
[49] In United States v. Reid (1851), the Court held that a jointly-indicted, separately-tried codefendant was not competent to be called as a witness.
