However, their presence in the DRC was supposed to be temporary, in order to allow them time and protection (the wideness of the territory and its forests offers much more possibility to hide than Rwanda) to build up an army and to organize their potential coup d'État.

Their number has been evaluated between 3000 and 4500 rebels (Mercier 2009) In order to develop their influence and control over the territory, the FDLR tried on a few occasions to create alliances with the Mayi-Mayi Kifufua, Simba or Tseka, but at the moment no long term alliance has been created and fights between the FDLR and these groups are believed to have occurred on access to mines.

The FDLR have an important impact in Walikale today: from all the armed groups’ presents in the region, they are the most organized, numerous, structured and their knowledge of the territory constitutes their strength.

The only way to reach these sites is by plane from Goma to Walikale Centre, followed by a long trek into the forest by motor bike and on foot (of a minimum of six hours).

[8] Initially, the Mayi-Mayi Kifuafua was a self-defense group, aiming at defending their villages against the CNDP (previously called the RDC) in the region of Ufamando, in South Kivu.

Today they have moved to South Walikale, in Walowa Loanda and Walowe Ubora regions, and control the southern axis of Chambucha to Karete.

This faction was formed by Tseka, a merchant of ore, by young peasant from Walikale having lost their lands during the war, by some deserters of the FARDC or by formers CNDPs.

Many armed groupings, often former Interahamwe or the militias of Laurent Nkunda, control the forests and have forced a significant proportion of the population into urban settlements.

These armed groups often inflict robbery and violence on the local people, as well as engage in hunting and poaching of nominally protected species.

Walikale Territory is represented in the National Assembly by two deputies: After the Congolese wars, Walikale territory had known a period of relative calm: surely, armed groups' activities had not ceased, "food lootings" were still frequent, and armed groups benefited from the central state’s ignorance of the region to continue their mining exploitation activities and to extend their local power.

Furthermore, the members of the FDLR even started to develop economic activities other than mining looting, such as farming, local trade of foodstuff or manufactured products, and even building a hospital or social infrastructures.

In addition, the vulnerability of the population was lower because the FDLR taxing system encouraged the production of foodstuff and the cultivation of land; the farmers and peasants were fewer victims of attacks and could access their camp with lesser fear than today.

Judging whether this first intervention was efficient or not is irrelevant here, but two months after, in March 2009, the FDLR had grown in power again and started to lead reprisal attacks on the population.

Instead of regular taxation, armed groups began to steal directly from the populations and to commit exactions in villages and on the fields.