[citation needed] By July 1990, since neither side had felt strong enough to force the issue militarily, Georgian-Abkhaz antagonisms became largely relegated to the legislatures, demarcating Abkhazia as a legal contest, a "war of laws", until armed hostilities broke out in August 1992.

This led to a civil war in Georgia between pro-Gamsakhurdia and pro-Shevardnadze forces, which encouraged separatist leaders in Abkhazia to take more bold stepts against the Georgian leadership.

This may have been nasty statement, but Karkarashvili was merely expressing in his own way the idea that was always reiterated by Georgian officials at the time — that it was the radicalism of the Abkhazia's leadership, not Georgia's, that endangered the existence of the Abkhaz as a group".

Thousands of volunteer paramilitaries, mainly Chechens and Cossacks from the militarized Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus (CMPC) and the Abkhaz military, equipped with T-72 tanks, BM-21 Grad rocket launchers, Sukhoi Su-25 attack planes, and helicopters, launched a major offensive.

On 4 March 1993, Eduard Shevardnadze, head of the State Council of Georgia, arrived in the capital of the region to take control over the defensive operations in the city.

Meanwhile, the Georgian Parliament made an official declaration blaming Russia for aggression against Georgia and demanding the withdrawal of all Russian military forces from the territory of Abkhazia.

On 2 July 1993 under Russian military directives and naval support, the Abkhaz and their (Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus) allies attacked the villages on the Gumista river.

On 5 July 1993, Abkhaz, Armenian Bagramyan battalion, Russian and North Caucasian detachments stormed the villages of Akhalsheni, Guma and Shroma of Sukhumi district.

Almost all members of the Georgian-backed Abkhaz government, who refused to leave the city, including Guram Gabiskiria, Raul Eshba and Zhiuli Shartava, were murdered.

[citation needed] On 3 September, 1992, Russian president Boris Yeltsin and Head of State Council of the Republic of Georgia Eduard Shevardnadze signed an agreement, formally known as Summary Document of the Moscow Meeting.

[63] Some weapons were gained by local raids on Russian Army bases in Akhalkalaki, Batumi, Poti and Vaziani by irregular Georgian paramilitary forces.

[citation needed] Prior to the outbreak of the war, the Abkhaz leadership arranged for the redeployment of a Russian airborne battalion from the Baltic states to Sukhumi.

To distract attention, various ruses were resorted to, such as the private exchange of apartments, or the necessity of moving one's place of work to Abkhazia due to a sudden deterioration of health.

Ardzinba had major supporters in Moscow as well, including Vice President Alexander Rutskoy and the Chechen speaker of the Russian Supreme Soviet, Ruslan Khasbulatov.

[65][66] After the eruption of armed conflict, the Abkhaz separatist paramilitary units, along with their political supporters fled to Gudauta from where they obtained significant amount of military and financial aid.

[72] The defense minister in the secessionist government and one of the main organizers of the Abkhaz armed units was the professional Russian military officer Sultan Sosnaliyev from the Kabardino-Balkaria Republic.

[76] Russian policy during the final battle for Sukhumi in September 1993, immediately, after the breach of the ceasefire by the Abkhaz forces, appeared to follow several lines.

[citation needed] Russian officials condemned the attack, issued calls to Abkhaz forces to cease the offensive and its accompanying human rights violations and reportedly cut off electricity and telephone service to parts of Abkhazia from September to December 1993.

[79] In a Time magazine article published on 4 October 1993, Georgians said Russian Army officers provided Abkhazian separatists, at the beginning using mere hunting rifles and shotguns, with sophisticated weapons like BM-21 multiple rocket launchers and Sukhoi SU-25 jet aircraft, plus battlefield intelligence.

[80] In the beginning of the conflict (August 1992), Russia evacuated many people from Abkhazian resorts by means of Black Sea fleet and Russian Air Force.

According to Catherine Dale from United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: In a former tourist camp in Kutaisi, a large gathering of displaced people tell of the "common practice" called the "Italian necktie", in which the tongue is cut out of the throat and tied around the neck.

[81]After taking Sukhumi, Georgian forces (including Mkhedrioni paramilitaries) engaged in "vicious, ethnically based pillage, looting, assault and murder.

[42] The 1994 U.S. State Department Country Reports also describes scenes of massive human rights abuse: When the Abkhazians entered my house, they took me and my seven-year old son outside.

[67]The Abkhaz side has been singled out as responsible for deliberate, as opposed to consequential, displacement carried out as a military, strategic and political objective in itself, resulting in a use of the term ethnic cleansing as a characterization for these actions.

The ethnic cleansing and massacres of Georgians has been officially recognized by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) conventions in 1994, 1996 and again in 1997 during the Budapest, Istanbul and Lisbon summits and condemned the "perpetrators of war crimes committed during the conflict".

[86] On 15 May 2008, the UN General Assembly adopted (by 14 votes to 11, with 105 abstentions) a resolution A/RES/62/249 in which it "Emphasizes the importance of preserving the property rights of refugees and internally displaced persons from Abkhazia, Georgia, including victims of reported "ethnic cleansing", and calls upon all Member States to deter persons under their jurisdiction from obtaining property within the territory of Abkhazia, Georgia in violation of the rights of returnees".

Print 1995), the victorious Abkhaz separatists "moved through captured towns with prepared lists and addresses of ethnic Georgians, plundered and burned homes and executed designated civilians."

[92] At the end of the war, the Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev said at the UN General Assembly: "Russia realizes that no international organization or group of states can replace our peacekeeping efforts in this specific post-Soviet space.

[citation needed] In June 1994, CIS peacekeeping forces comprising only the Russian soldiers were deployed along the administrative border between Abkhazia and the remaining Georgia.

Negotiations toward a permanent peace settlement have made little progress, but the Georgian and Abkhaz governments have agreed to limit the size of their military forces and extend the authorization for UNOMIG.