War of ideas
Waging a war of ideas can involve think tanks, television programs, journalistic articles (newspaper, magazine, weblogs), government policies, and public diplomacy.
Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back.Richard M. Weaver published Ideas Have Consequences in 1948 by the University of Chicago Press.
The book is largely a treatise on the harmful effects of nominalism on Western civilization since that doctrine gained prominence in the High Middle Ages, followed by a prescription of a course of action through which Weaver believes the West might be rescued from its decline.
"[2][3] Gingrich declared,[4] The Heritage Foundation is without question the most far-reaching conservative organization in the country in the war of ideas, and one that has had a tremendous impact not just in Washington, but literally across the planet.
"By the 1990s the term "war of ideas" was used to polarize debates on economic systems with socialism and central planning on one end of the spectrum and free enterprise and private property on the other.
Thus, while the act of communicating strategically remains a vital part of any war of ideas, we need to manage our expectations as far as what it can accomplish.In a New York Times Magazine series[9] commemorating the 10th anniversary of the September 11 attacks, a round table was held bringing together Paul Berman, Scott Malcomson, James Traub, David Rieff, Ian Burama and Michael Ignatieff.
Instead, they tend to drag on, unless an event occurs that causes the belligerents to focus their attention elsewhere (Echevarria).Echevarria uses[1] Kuhn's controversial incommensurability thesis[10] as a claim to relativism and therefore a defense of engagement in the war of ideas.
Furthermore, the hold of the Kuhnian analysis on social science has long been tenuous with the wide application of multi-paradigmatic approaches in order to understand complex human behaviour (see for example John Hassard, Sociology and Organization Theory: Positivism, Paradigm and Postmodernity.
"[14] In the early 2010s, Thomas E. Mann and Norm Ornstein claim that the dysfunctionality of American politics was worse than it had ever been up to that point, saying that "the partisan and ideological polarization from which we now suffer comes at a time when critical problems cry out for resolution, making for a particularly toxic mix.
"[15] The extreme and asymmetric partisan polarization that has evolved over several decades, initially reflecting increasing ideological differences but then extending well beyond issues that ordinarily divide the parties to advance strategic electoral interests, fits uneasily with a set of governing institutions that puts up substantial barriers to majority rule.
To improve that fit—either by producing less polarized combatants or by making political institutions and practices more responsive to parliamentary-like parties—we as a people need to think about ambitious reforms of electoral rules and governing arrangements.
The former can include, for example, focusing more on the demand side of campaign finance than on the supply side.Bruce Thornton of the Hoover Institute argues that polarization is good for democracy and that "bipartisan compromise is deeply over-rated.
"[16] Darrell West, the vice president and director of governance studies at the Brookings Institution, claims that we are living in "parallel political universes seemingly unable to comprehend or deal with each other.
Those outside of government, such as "individuals, advocacy groups, businesses, and the news media" must recognize how "their own behaviours hinder leadership and make it difficult for elected and administrative officials to bargain and negotiate."
[21] This school of thought contends that American public diplomacy declined after the Cold War, as evidenced by the demise of the U.S. Information Agency in 1999, and the reduction or elimination of strategic communications programs such as "Voice of America," and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
This approach sees public diplomacy as an essential, but insufficient tool because it requires too much time to achieve desired results, and does little to aid the immediate efforts of combat forces in the field.
[26] High-level interest in such operations waned during the 1970s, but received renewed emphasis under President Ronald Reagan, the Great Communicator, who, like Dwight D. Eisenhower, was a firm advocate of the informational component of America's Cold War strategy.
[28] There is growing recognition among U.S. government officials, journalists, and analysts of terrorism that defeating al-Qaida—arguably the preeminent challenge to U.S. security—will require far more than neutralizing leaders, disrupting cells, and dismantling networks.
[29] The 9/11 Commission concluded in its final report, eliminating al-Qaida as a formidable danger ultimately requires prevailing in the longer term over the ideology that gives rise to Islamist terrorism.
Westerners tend to downplay intangible factors such as ideas, history, and culture as political motivators, preferring instead to stress more concrete driving forces such as personal security and physical well-being.
In addition to the military's traditional role of using force they are beginning to use political as well as ideological warfare against the enemy as a method of influencing the local populations into opposing say the Taliban or al Qa'ida.
