According to Fred Charles Iklé, "[H]istorians, foreign affairs experts, and military strategists have devoted far more thought to the question of how and why wars begin.
"[1] This idea is echoed by Gideon Rose, who writes: For all endgames' drama and historical importance, however, they have received far less attention than other phases of war.
[3] War termination is coercive bargaining [4] and it only comes to an end when two interacting sides can agree upon their relative strength and credibly commit to a settlement (Goemans, 2000; Stanley and Sawyer, 2009).
[4][page needed] The adjustment of expectations, however, can also come from a change in the foreign policy leadership itself, or as Stanley and Sawyer (2009) would say, from domestic coalition shifts.
[8] And finally, there is the risk of entrapment, which can be defined as decision makers wanting to end the war, having all the information needed to do so, but not being able to do it, due to "internal or external hawkish constituencies."
Negotiation is paramount for the achievement of peace as defined by Clausewitz: the acceptance by the belligerents that the war results are final, not something that can be changed by violence when more favourable circumstances appear.