A conflict arose between the two as the latter in cooperation with the Norwegian Airline Pilots Association did not want a police investigation until after their report was finished.

However, it found several pilot errors and laid a large responsibility on the airline for lack of proper organization and routines.

No-one was charged after the accident, but it led to a major restructure of operations and procedures in Widerøe.

He had flown 4,835 hours in total and had landed 13 times at Namsos Airport in the 12 months prior to the accident.

[3] The first officer, Trond Hamre, was 34 years old, had training from the United States which had been converted to a C certificate in 1988.

[7] The aircraft left Trondheim Airport at 18:37 after which it ascended to cruising height at 1,500 meters (4,900 feet).

An ELT signal was received by Namsos and a search and rescue operation was started immediately.

[9] The weather in the area had wind up towards 30 knots (56 km/h; 35 mph), with clouds and heavy rain, and some reports of turbulence.

[13] Interviews with the surviving passengers showed that none of them perceived that there was any problems with the flight until the sudden impact.

The report pointed to several errors, both from the pilots, but also systematic failures from Widerøe and the Norwegian Aviation Authority.

The base turn procedure was also criticized, because the crew failed to time it correctly, ending up 14 nautical miles (26 km; 16 mi) from the airport.

The crew were not aware of their distance from the terrain; the small margins from 150 to 119 meters (492 to 390 feet) were in part caused by pilots' unawareness.

The airline was criticized for not having standardized an operative concept that the crew fully respected and followed.

The site was subject to sleet, rain and a southwestern wind, causing the victims to quickly freeze.

The wounded were carried to the farm, where they received initial treatment before being transported to Namsos Hospital—the last arriving at 22:30.

The company's executive management met in Bodø the evening of the accident before chief executive officer Bård Mikkelsen and others traveled to Namsos to investigate the crash site of the third fatal accident since Mikkelsen started in his position in 1988.

[19] Widerøe announced in November that they would accelerate the replacement of their Twin Otter and de Havilland Canada Dash 7 aircraft with new de Havilland Canada Dash 8 aircraft, but denied that the accident influenced the decision and instead cited financial reasons.

[20] Widerøe's chief operating officer, Per-Helge Røbekk, announced in July 1994 that he would step down because of the strain of the three accidents.

[26] The instrument landing system at Namsos Airport was tested by the Norwegian Aviation Authority on 28 October and 4 November, without any faults being found.

The Norwegian Data Inspectorate's director, Georg Apenes, supported the police in their request for the tapes.

[29] On 17 November the issue was brought to Parliament by the Liberal Party's Lars Sponheim, but Minister of Transport and Communications Kjell Opseth stated that he did not want to interfere.

[38] In February 1995, SINTEF handed over a report ordered by the commission which revealed several absent safety procedures in Widerøe.

[39] In June, parliamentarian Magnus Stangeland criticized the commission for working too slowly, stating that the victims and next of kin needed answers as to why the accident happened.

Similar delays had occurred after Partnair Flight 394 in 1989, which had resulted in the statute of limitations having come into effect by the time the report was published.

[41] The final report was published on 10 July 1996 and laid the responsibility for the accident on the company and its operating routines.