[2] The crew consisted of 40-year-old Captain Idar Nils Persen and 31-year-old First Officer Arnt Vidar Grønneflåta.

First Officer Grønneflåta was hired by Widerøe in June 1989 and had a total of 1,370 flight hours, 350 of which were as a commander pilot.

During this flight the crew received information that the wind at the east end of the runway was from 270°, varying from 18 to 26 knots (9.3 to 13.4 m/s; 33 to 48 km/h) — a moderate gale.

The aircraft asked for clearance at 14:42:10; this was granted, and the air control informed that the wind at the west end was between 210° and 290°, varying from 18 to 34 knots (9.3 to 17.5 m/s; 33 to 63 km/h).

At 14:43:54, the control tower at Værøy registered a distress signal, that lasted four seconds, followed by a loud bang.

[2] After the weather improved, one rescue ship, four fishing vessels and one Westland Sea King were used to find the wreck.

[2] The runway at Værøy Airport, that runs east–west, ran parallel to a mountain to the south that is about 500 m (1,600 ft) tall.

Prior to construction, Widerøe had performed test flights in the area, and these had concluded with unacceptable wind conditions, particularly from the south over the mountain.

The board commented that the flight being the last before Easter, it may have influenced the pilots' sense of duty towards getting the passengers to their destinations.

[2] Prior to this, Værøy and Røst had been served by helicopters using a heliport; that had replaced previous services with seaplanes.

Høvik stated that he felt that many of the airports were located in the wrong place, for instance at the bottom of valleys, on top of hills and between mountains.

[8] The report from the Accident Investigation Board was highly critical to the Norwegian Civil Aviation Administration, stating that the airport should never have been built where it was and that it was "clearly unsuitable for regular traffic".

The commission that wrote the report and conducted the investigation, stated that the Civil Aviation Administration had not proceeded correctly while planning the airport—they had chosen Nordlandet early as a location and ignored negative comments.

The commission also commented that the safety division had been critical to the localization of the airport but had withdrawn their disputes following pressure from higher ranks in the administration.

The commission also criticized the Civil Aviation Administration for not conducting investigations following the reports of low regularity and the incidents in 1988 and 1989.

The Piper and experimental craft made at least one landing and take-off each, during a public show held close to the airport.

[11] In an article published in the newspaper Fremover (Narvik, Norway), in May 1994, the English aviation engineer Hugh Tyrer stated that the cause of the accident was probably due to fatigue in the end piece of the transfer mechanism to the elevator.

Following this discovery in the wreck, Widerøe had grounded all their Twin Otters and checked these pieces, but without finding any other defect parts.

de Havilland Canada had also sent an alert to all operators of the Twin Otter to check the component and had canceled the contract with the subcontractor.

On 800 operating Twin Otters, 86 end pieces were replaced shortly after the accident, although none had fatigue similar to that of LN-BNS.

[12][13][14] Member of parliament, Inge Myrvoll, and president of the Norwegian Airline Pilots Association, Cpt.

Helland stated that the report's credibility was weakened due to the influence de Havilland Canada had during the process.

[15][16] The Accident Investigation Board used the National Aerospace Laboratory in the Netherlands to conduct tests on the end pieces.

[18] The journalist Oddvar Kristoffersen in Fremover won the SKUP Award for 1994 for his work related to uncovering the controversy.