He also gained experience in radio broadcasting, working army football games alongside legendary sports commentators such as Floyd Gibbons, Ted Husing, and Bill Stern.

[4][3] Early in his military career, Baumer was stationed with the 18th Infantry Regiment at Fort Wadsworth, New York, before being assigned to Camp Dix, New Jersey, where he worked with the Civilian Conservation Corps.

Under Colonel Herman Beukema, head of the social sciences department, Baumer was encouraged to pursue graduate education in anticipation of the coming global conflict.

Baumer recorded Patton's initial shock at the assignment—expecting to be sent to Egypt to confront Rommel—but noted that the General quickly recovered and demanded, "Get me every son of a bitch who knows anything about North Africa."

[3] He was eventually joined by two others of his Class-of-1933 West Point classmates who played key roles in the Allied deception campaigns: Lt. William Allen Harris and Lt. Col. Arthur Alfred McCrary.

The British had been engaged in the development of psychological warfare techniques for over a year under the leadership of Colonel John Bevan at the highly secretive London Controlling Section (LCS).

[3][8] Although the various branches of the U.S. military initially remained skeptical about the value of deception operations, and progress was slow, momentum gradually built with the establishment of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee (JPWC).

His work placed him in close collaboration with notable figures such as the acclaimed novelist and intelligence officer Dennis Wheatley, Harold Petevel, Ronald Wingateas, and other leading members of Britain's deception hierarchy.

Baumer played a key role in the coordination and implementation of several tactics: By early 1944, it was clear that the Soviets would need to join Operation Bodyguard for the deception to succeed.

Baumer was chosen to accompany Colonel John Bevan and represent the British and American Chiefs of Staff in securing Soviet cooperation for the deception campaign.

Their aircraft was a British C-87 bomber not yet converted for passenger transport, which required them to lie on the floor of the bomb bay, strapped in with blankets and plugged into heated flight suits for survival.

At one of these, Russian officers pushed endless toasts, leaving Bevan quite ill.[8]: 115–116 The final breakthrough in the negotiations occurred in a 1:30 am meeting at the Kremlin (the Soviet hierarchies' work day started at 5 pm and ended at 5 am).

Baumer and Bevan were caught off guard when the Soviets suddenly announced that they accepted the deception plan "lock, stock, and barrel" and would work to execute it in coordination with the Allies.

Baumer had to step in and personally type out the revised versions on an old English typewriter, while simultaneously attending a strategy meeting and listening to a conversation about using the press for deception.

While his work had played a crucial role in misleading German forces before Operation Overlord, shifting priorities and leadership changes meant that deception planning lost some of its earlier momentum.

[18] Throughout the war, Baumer maintained detailed records of strategic discussions, military deception tactics, and intelligence-sharing efforts between Allied nations in his diary and personal papers.

These papers have all been collected at The Hoover Institute and give firsthand accounts of wartime decision-making, the inner workings of high-level military conferences, the challenges of interservice rivalries, and the diplomatic maneuvering that shaped Allied strategy.

He provides candid assessments of key figures, such as General Eisenhower and Prime Minister Churchill and the logistical and strategic challenges faced in both the European and Pacific theaters.

He recorded that American planners, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, lacked a unified approach and were often outmaneuvered by the more prepared British delegation, which had clear objectives.

He described meetings in Washington where Army officers, including General MacArthur's staff, clashed with Navy leadership over the allocation of resources and command authority in the South Pacific.