During the voyage south, the group temporarily was diverted to attack Convoy SL 119 which had been attacked gruppe Blücher and U-156 sank SS Clan Macwhirter (5,941 GRT) on 27 August and sank the liner SS Laconia on 12 September, which began the Laconia Incident, leading to U-156 being replaced in Eisbär by U-159 and the group being redirected to the waters around South Africa.

From mid-July 1942, to tie down Allied convoy escorts and to sink more ships in distant waters, four to six U-boats and a U-tanker operated in the middle-Atlantic, west of Freetown in Sierra Leone.

As in 1941, an extension of operations to the South Atlantic was planned by the Naval War Staff (Seekriegsleitung, SKL) for the summer of 1942, to exert strategic pressure.

[1] The surprise appearance of a U-boat group off South Africa, was to inhibit the transport of Allied reinforcements to the Middle East and interrupt trade with India.

The U-boat commanders received orders to avoid contact with all merchant ships south of the Equator and only to attack valuable targets such as big warships.

[1] Rear-Admiral (Konteradmiral) Karl Dönitz the commander, U-boats (Befehlshaber der U-Boote BdU) disagreed with SKL because the strategic pressure that could be exerted was insufficient justification for a long-range operation.

SKL, basing its strategic calculations on the widening war, refuse to relent until 6 September, when gruppe Eisbär received freedom of action against merchant shipping as far as 5° South.

For the duration of Operation Torch (8–12 November), ships were routed far to the south of Cape Town and then north-west to Brazil, Trinidad and the US, to join convoys across the north Atlantic.

[9] In late 1942, the demands of Operation Torch, especially the duration of the campaign in Algeria and Tunisia, that ended in May 1943 and required more supplies from more convoys, stretched the Allied escort effort.

The west Africa–south Africa–east Africa route continued without convoy for much longer; ships were sent on devious courses to evade U-boats but they had eventually to cross the South Atlantic.

Emmermann in U-172 had a Metox radar detector and moved towards Table Bay on the surface, placing most of the crew on the deck, wearing life jackets, in case a mine was set off.

[14] U-159 had gone into action off Cape Town on and sank the US ship SS Coloradan on 9 October then survived a depth-charge attack by a South African aircraft.

[16] By this time, U-159 was on the return leg of its voyage and refuelled from U-461 before sailing for St Paul's Rocks, about 510 nmi (940 km; 590 mi) to the north-east of Brazil, then raiding along the Brazilian coast.

On 29 October, short of fuel, U-68 began the journey home and on 6 November, about 500 nmi (930 km; 580 mi) south of Saint Helena sank SS City of Cairo with the loss of 104 crew and passengers.

[18] U-504 commenced operations off Cape Town on 17 October then headed up the east coast of South Africa and sank SS Empire of Chaucer.

[20] U-177 and U-188 reached Cape Town at about the same time and on 2 November, U-177 attacked the Greek SS Aegeus (4,500 GRT) with four torpedoes, the two that hit set off the cargo of ammunition and the ship exploded, showering the submarine with débris, injuring a lookout.

For the next ten days the submarines searched off Cape Town, U-177 attacking the US 2,600 GRT freighter SS Cerion after a five-hour chase and missing with five torpedoes.

[21] Ammiraglio Cagni sank the Greek ship SS Argo (2,000 GRT) on 29 November but a greater ASW effort being made off the Cape of Good Hope led the commander, Carlo Liannazza, to sail for home, refuelling near the equator from U-459 and returning to BETASOM (Bordeaux).

[23] In 2000, Werner Rahn, a German military historian and one of the authors of Germany and the Second World War (1979 to 2008) wrote that though the British had discovered the southward movement of the boats and had taken such defensive measures as they could, like rerouting, the U-boats sank 15 ships (108,070 GRT) in five days from7 October.

Gruppe Eisbär was followed by a second wave of Type IXD2 U-cruisers, with a range of 31,000 nmi (57,000 km; 36,000 mi) at 10 kn (19 km/h; 12 mph) obviating the need to refuel and take on supplies.

The sinkings off Cape Town and in the Indian Ocean did little to obstruct the reinforcement of the British in Egypt and the offensive that followed the defence of El Alamein because the bulk of it has already arrived.

[24] In 2005, Richard Woodman wrote that for the loss of U-179 the German long-range submarines exposed the vulnerability of British shipping which was necessarily dispersed all over the globe.

The sinking of U-179 was the only result of the anti-submarine warfare effort made in the region because the U-boats did not follow Rudeltaktik (wolfpack tactics) but operated individually.