Zangezur corridor
In January 1919, Britain approved Azerbaijani jurisdiction over the territory[25] but Armenian resistance outlasted military pressure until both republics were integrated into the Soviet Union.
Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov said that the activity of this group will serve the implementation of confidence-building measures and resolution of humanitarian problems, and that the interests of Turkey and Iran are taken into account during trilateral consultations.
[37] On 14 January 2022, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan set up a working group for reconstruction of the Yeraskh to Nakhichevan border and Meghri sections of the Armenian railways.
In May 2021, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said that while Armenia is not willing to discuss 'corridor logic', it is keen on opening transport links as means of direct railway communication with Iran and Russia.
A day earlier, Armenian Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan said that progress was made toward the railway connections dating from the Soviet period being restored.
[48] On 9 November 2021, the Deputy Prime Minister of Russia and the co-chair of the trilateral task force dealing with cross-border connections Alexei Overchuk said that "Armenia and Azerbaijan will retain sovereignty over roads passing through their territory".
[16] According to Iranian-born American political scientist Shireen Hunter, Turkey has been trying for a long time to establish a direct link to Azerbaijan by eliminating Iran's access to Armenia.
[53] She added: "if Turkey decides to push its long-held ambition of creating a direct link to the republic of Azerbaijan by eliminating Iran's access to Armenia, then the risk of escalation will increase".
[53] Ahmad Kazemi, the author of the book Security in South Caucasus, told Iran's Strategic Council on Foreign Relations that "Azerbaijan is seeking to establish the so-called pan-Turkist illusionary Zangezur corridor in south of Armenia under the pretext of creating connectivity in the region", arguing that "this corridor is not compatible with any of the present geopolitical and historical realities of the region".
[58] Azerbaijani member of parliament Hikmat Babaoghlu condemned the idea, arguing that it weakens Azerbaijan's public case to create the Zangezur corridor.
[60] In the opinion of Thomas de Waal, a former journalist and a senior fellow with Carnegie Europe, "The economic benefits of the opening of closed transport routes in the South Caucasus, including as set out in the November 2020 ceasefire agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, could extend to all the countries of the region as well as to Russia, Turkey, and Iran.
According to de Waal, "Security concerns also haunt plans to reopen the crucial transport route across southern Armenia to and from Azerbaijan's exclave of Nakhchivan.
[61] Michael Rubin, a senior scholar at the right-leaning think tank American Enterprise Institute (AEI), wrote that Turkey and Azerbaijan presidents are trying to redefine the clause on unblocking regional communications in trilateral ceasefire agreement by interpreting it as granting them a corridor bisecting sovereign Armenian territory and ignoring the first sentence in the clause about unblocking economic and transport connections across the region.
Rubin called this reinterpretation unwarranted and illegitimate, arguing that the removing the double blockade of Armenia in order to reduce Armenian dependence upon Russia and Iran would be the best way forward from the situation.
[62] According to Stephen Blank, Senior Fellow at Foreign Policy Research Institute's Eurasia Program, the Zangezur Corridor stands out as the optimal way to bypass Russia's "blockade of global supply routes"; Armenia's acceptance would also re-affirm its commitment to partnership with the West.
[63] The international relations scholars Javad Heiran-Nia and Mahmood Monshipouri opine that Russia aims to solidify access to the markets of the Middle East through the supposed Zangezur corridor.
[64] In 1992, picking up on a proposal apparently originally drafted by Paul Goble of the US State Department, President Özal and the then Foreign Minister Hikmet Çetin promoted the so-called "double-corridor formula".
