[1] Based on experiences learned from the 1982 Lebanon War, constant relocation of all assets was key to survival of Dani's unit, the 3rd missile detachment of the 250th Yugoslav Air Defense Battalion.

This rule proved essential, because other Yugoslav AAA units, emitting high-frequency radiation for any longer periods or forgetting to relocate, were hit by AGM-88 HARM missile counter-strikes from NATO aircraft, suffering radar equipment and personnel losses.

In order to train personnel to operate efficiently under such pressures, Dani obtained access to an "Accord" electronic signal simulator, which allowed the SA-3 radar and guidance crew practice combat scenarios based on imitated engagements.

Several soldiers were removed from position both during the pre-war practice drills and wartime guard shifts, when they proved unable to cope with the psychological stress of being targeted by enemy aircraft.

Their northern heading was pointing away from the direction of powerful NATO airborne jammer sources, thereby allowing the SA-3's un-modernized UNV fire control radar set to operate with less interference.

Retired SAM radar sets were used as optical decoys, left at well-known military bases to lure NATO warplanes to waste munition on worthless targets.

General surveillance of NATO aircraft was provided by vintage P-18 radar sets, which used vacuum tubes and a large rotating Yagi antenna grid for meter-band illumination.

Under optimal conditions the Soviet-made P-18 was able to plot large-Radar cross-section aircraft from 125 to 200 km (78 to 124 mi), depending on the target's size, but with a high range inaccuracy of several hundred meters.

Dani tuned his P-18 to the lowest possible frequency, hoping that meter band waves would reflect from the inside of targets, rendering stealth aircraft skin technology ineffective.

In practice his modified P-18 provided stable plot of F-117 movements from just 25 km (16 mi), which was useful when combined with the comparatively short missile range of the SA-3 air defense complex.

The radio signal logs of unit 250/3 contain two further proximity fuse activation pings beyond the F-117 and F-16 shootdown events, indicating that either extra NATO aircraft were hit or ALE-50 towed jammer devices were destroyed by the missiles, as opposed to the SAMs simply missing due to radar jamming or chaff dispersal.

The one recorded on 30 April 1999. by the combat shift commanded by Major Boško Dotlić corresponds to a hit on a second F-117 which managed to return to its base in Spangdahlem, Germany, only to be written off.