Phuong Nguyen noted that "Trong's reappointment was a crucial development which set the tone for Vietnam's politics and direction in the wake of the congress,"[5] and that, after a competition with Dung, these political developments are viewed as signs that public opinion and elite factionalism will play an increasing role in Vietnam's foreign policy.

This is supported by the fact that during the 2013 National Assembly confidence vote, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung won the full support of just 42% of the national assembly and was given "low confidence" ratings by about a third of the house, in contrast to President Truong Tan Sang, who won 330 high-confidence votes from the 498 lawmakers and only 28 low-confidence ballots.

After the 12th National Congress, the Politburo made several adjustments, including a vote on the nomination of Nguyen Phu Trong as president on October 3, after the death of Trần Đại Quang's in September.

The primary task of his mission was to reaffirm the authority of the party in all decisions, to alleviate corruption and rent-seeking behavior, and to provide a sense of direction for the next phase of Vietnam's doi moi efforts.

As such, several powerful figures have entered the politburo and are playing a significant role into the state's development plan: Nguyen Xuan Phuc, a former deputy prime minister and economist by training, was appointed prime minister; Nguyen Thi Kim Ngan, former Vice-Chair of the National Assembly became Chairwoman of the legislature, making her the first woman to ever hold that post; Vuong Dinh Hue, a former head of the party central economic committee, became the Deputy Prime Minister; Dinh The Huynh, the previous party's propaganda chief took the position of Executive Secretary of the party secretariat.

The third is centered around corruption, which arouses distrust within the party and society and caused the Central Committee to turn their support to Trong's idea of economic reform and anti-corruption proposal.

Conservatives accused Dung of being involved with economic misconduct, causing state-owned companies to close down, being unable to control large public debts, and condoning corruption.

Although privatization is conducive to the development of Vietnamese polities,[citation needed] the grassroots' masses still rely on state-owned enterprises in Vietnam.

Privatization suffers from at least three serious shortcomings: a focus on micro-efficiency through regulation at the expense of SOE's social and public functions; laggard implementation due to misalignments of political incentives; and the shaky equitization process.

Second, the central government wants to accelerate and control the reform of state-owned enterprises, while other parts of the state – especially local, provincial, or departmental – are resistant to these efforts.

Cutting red tape means to provide a favourable environment for investment, one of the most important factors is the reduction of regulations and paperwork.

[11] Government resolution 112/NQ-CP tabled on 30 October 2017 abolishing the registration book (so ho khau) to manage and control people's place of residence.

[14] According to previous speculation on Trong's vigorous anti-corruption campaign, power will be more concentrated on the general secretary, which is one of the various reforms that the Central Committee hopes to avoid but cannot oppose.

Privatization suffers from at least three serious shortcomings: a focus on micro-efficiency through regulation at the expense of SOE's social and public functions, laggard implementation due to misalignments of political incentives, and the shaky equitization process.

[13] Four major themes form Vietnam's foreign policy framework: independence and self-reliance, multilateralism and diversification of external relations, struggle and cooperation, and pro-active international integration.

[18] Vietnam's policy of multilateralism and diversifying its foreign relations was endorsed by all subsequent national party congresses from the eighth (1996) onward.

"[19] and "to ensure successful implementation of foreign policy and international integration... [Vietnam must] be proactive and active in international integration; to be a friend, reliable partner, and a responsible member of the international community..."[19] The practice of Vietnamese successful foreign policy depends on two important factors: the presence and credible commitment of the United States to serve as a counterweight to the increasing assertiveness of China, and ASEAN unity to provide Vietnam with some sort of bargaining power in dealing with major powers.

Vietnam's foreign policy is shifting to protect a constant development in the region and a continuous benefit from international integration.