In early July, the revolt was triggered by the closure of the Military Club and the brief arrest of Hermes da Fonseca for his public opposition to the government's interference, using the army, in the election in Pernambuco.

The conspiracy was poorly organized and on the night of 4 July the loyalists managed to surround Fort Copacabana and arrest the officers who would revolt the large troops at Vila Militar.

The greatest fame of July 1922 was the Fort Copacabana and the suicidal will of the small number of rebels who marched against the government's troops, an episode that acquired a mythical character.

[2] In the presidential election, scheduled for 1 March, the government candidate to succeed Epitácio Pessoa was Artur Bernardes, president (governor) of Minas Gerais and a representative of the dominant groups of his state and São Paulo.

Several explanations have already been proposed for this oligarchic split, such as the dispute for the vice presidency, the defiance to the economic policy favorable to coffee, a first test of populism or a challenge to the domination of the federal system by Minas Gerais and São Paulo.

Lieutenants were discouraged by their slow career progression and their failure to join and fight in World War I. Calógeras' management and the French Mission attracted criticism, accusations of corruption and difficulties in adapting to the new models.

[30] Dissident soldiers considered politics dominated by the "low and private interests" of status quo supporters;[29] for them, civilian politicians had betrayed the Republic, which had been proclaimed by the army.

[45] In February, the journal Estado de S. Paulo published a circular, signed "The Army", in which there was a conspiracy to depose governors and the president and hand over power to Nilo Peçanha or a dictator.

[46] After the defeat in Mato Grosso, general Clodoaldo da Fonseca declared that he hoped to count on the army and the Military Brigade of Rio Grande do Sul, and the movement could come at the end of October.

[11][57] He was also removed from the presidency of the Military Club, which, due to assuming its participation, was closed for six months[56] based on the Adolfo Gordo Law, which allowed the closure of brothels and anarchist establishments.

[1] Ironically, the fort was the "apple of the eye" of minister Pandiá Calógeras, who treated its officers with special consideration, including Delso Mendes da Fonseca and Antônio de Siqueira Campos.

[71] At night, marshal Hermes had disappeared from the Palace Hotel, heading to Vila Militar, as well as several suspicious officers, and the government already predicted the revolt of Fort Copacabana.

[70] At stations on the Central do Brasil Railway, officers looking for trains were also arrested under orders of general Manuel Lopes Carneiro da Fontoura, commander of the 1st Military Region [pt].

[80] At 21:00 captain José da Silva Barbosa went to the Ministry of War, where he was charged with taking command of the 1st Coastal Artillery Battery, Fort Copacabana, to prevent the uprising.

[81] The director of the army's Cartridge Factory, colonel João Maria Xavier de Brito Júnior, removed the ammunition for use in the revolt from the nearby Military School of Realengo.

One stayed in front of the barracks, while he led the other to the regimental officers' casino, where captain José Barbosa Monteiro (commander of the company), colonel Sezefredo dos Passos and others were.

The second shot went in the same direction; the third, to the rock at the base of Fort Vigia, alerting the population, and the fourth, to the 3rd Infantry Regiment, as a protest against the arrest of Hermes da Fonseca.

[23] Loyalist reinforcements were already on the way: a squadron from the 1st Divisional Cavalry Regiment, heading towards Realengo in reconnaissance, and, towards Méier, a detachment under general João de Deus Mena Barreto, commander of the 2nd Infantry Brigade.

[101] According to Siqueira Campos, a poorly communicated withdrawal order, during the bombardment of Santa Cruz, resulted in the destruction of a French 75mm cannon used in the external defense; it was thrown into the water.

Of the more than three hundred men in the garrison, only 29 remained — five officers (Euclides, Siqueira, Eduardo Gomes, Mário Carpenter and Newton Prado), two sergeants, a corporal, sixteen privates and five civilians.

The geography of Guanabara Bay nullified the battleships' mobility advantage, forcing them to fight at close range (less than 7,250 meters), in which even their most protected parts could be pierced by the fort's shells.

Siqueira Campos managed to speak with Euclides by telephone, being informed that the Ministers of War and Navy guaranteed the life of the rebels if they left the fort and surrendered unconditionally.

[120] From the 28 men who remained in the fort, plus Octavio Correia, Hélio Silva listed ten, nine military and one civilian, in the shooting, including two unknown soldiers, a black and a white one.

Siqueira Campos, Eduardo Gomes, Otávio Correia, Mário Carpenter, Nilton Prado and José Pinto de Oliveira were taken to the hospital wounded, where only the first two survived.

[117][123] Another soldier included in this category by Hélio Silva, Manoel Antonio dos Santos, testified to O Cruzeiro magazine 42 years later, declaring that he had fought on the beach alongside ten other men.

[144][145] In Mato Grosso, general Joaquim Ignacio, commander of the 1st Military Circumscription, took part in the conspiracies against the government in Campo Grande, for which reason he was dismissed on 30 March.

On 13 June, general Alberto Cardoso de Aguiar conferred with Clodoaldo da Fonseca at the Três Lagoas railway station, convincing him to surrender unconditionally to avoid bloodshed.

In addition to arresting the rebels, the state of emergency was also used to persecute opposition journalists, such as Edmundo Bittencourt [pt], owner of Correio da Manhã, which had published the fake letters.

[171] Tenentism represented middle-class concerns against the coffee oligarchies and their allies, advocating for a moralization of politics imposed from the top down,[145] with a strong central government, contrary to regionalism and corruption.

[188] The suicidal outcome of the revolt in Copacabana, and not the "uprising inspired by an indecisive Hermes da Fonseca", became mythical,[170][189] generating martyrs and an image of heroism that fed the idealism of the following rebellions.