1955 System
[6] The years of Japan under the 1955 regime witnessed high economic growth, but it also led to the dominance of the ruling party in the Diet, with an undergirded tight connection between the bureaucracy and the business sector.
[10] After the failure of Katayama cabinet, voters lost confidence in the Socialist Party, which led to the takeover of government by Shigeru Yoshida.
The leftists in the party adopted a Marxist ideology, while the rightists leaned towards a socialist welfare nation under a capitalist system.
After the split, however, the socialists soon realized the necessity of merging into one party to fight against the anti-communist approach taken by the GHQ and the conservatives, which is commonly referred to as the reverse course (逆コース).
After the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect, influential members from the Right Socialist Party of Japan came back from the purge and boosted the power of the rightists.
[17] Due to the rationalization strategy taken by the conservative government Japanese workers, particular those who worked in small and median-sized factories, were facing slow wage increase and even dismissals.
The zaikai had incentives to secure a conservative government since it would pump money into the big companies to keep their competitiveness, stay in a close relationship with the U.S. to maintain a liberal trade policy, and deal with the intensified labor movement.
Accordingly, the CIA was involved in helping encourage and support the merger of the Japanese conservative parties to form the LDP.
[19] During the occupation years, Minister Matsumoto Joji (松本烝治) drafted the 1946 constitution under the demand of General Douglas MacArthur.
[24] Because of the size of the protests and dogged JSP opposition in the Diet, ratification of the revised treaty proved extremely difficult.
Kishi was replaced as prime minister by Hayato Ikeda, who managed to tame factional rivalries and stabilize the 1955 System.
Which it directed to individual candidates to enabled them to promise patronage to their voters, with a focus on the agricultural population, as the reallocation of Diet seats did not keep up with the migration from rural to urban areas due to industrialisation.
The formal campaign periods were short (and shortened further over time), television and radio advertising being prohibited and low limits placed on posters and handbills.
Such rules of play were discouraging and difficult for a would-be challenger while LDP benefited from the unfair restraints of participation by the sheer amount of runners.
[29] Another neglected flaw of the electoral system, which bolstered LDP's dominance, was the urgent need for redistricting in the wake of the post-war rapid population shifts from the rural to urban areas.
The swelling urban populations were much trickier for LDP politicians to fit within the distributed koenkai grassroot structure, as they were more peripatetic and atomized than the traditional rural household.
These voters had new policy demands (e.g. issues related to environmental deterioration in the 1960s) which conflicted with the ones practiced by LDP for their industry and big-business support.
Under the obsolete district constituencies, the farmers retained disproportionate political influence which, as a consequence of pork barrel desires rather than by concern over issues of broad social policy, stagnated democratic alternation.
[30] Under the current electoral rules, LDP was motivated to develop loyal personal support for the farmer's voter group.
Being a nationally organized group of voters and united around the single issue of agricultural protectionism, the party could tune higher import tariffs and subsidies to support the less productive small businesses which, because of their large numbers, could turn out at elections and vote in predictable ways.
[31] Furthermore, the bureaucracy wields considerable and increasing power through the use of non-legislative devices such a subordinances and communications, and through its varying degrees of dominance over technical and nonpartisan advisory groups.
[31] The Policy Affairs Research Council (政務調査会, seimu chōsakai) or "PARC" was the major policymaking body within the LDP.
Its members were the LDP representatives in both legislative houses, and it was the basic forum in which the party discussed and negotiated government policy.
In consultation with bureaucrats and interested groups, the council already had input into policy before the cabinet and prime minister or upper party executives could shape it further.
The large war companies lobbied for a development strategy favoring heavy industry and received subsidies and regulatory favoritism.
As a corollary of the Plaza Accord of 1985 when Japan agreed to allow substantial appreciation of the yen, the Japanese government reduced the interests marginally above the rate of inflation as a domestic relief strategy.
This resulted in banks and corporations going on an enormous spending spree with nearly free money, bidding up the price of real estate and other assets.
[34] The specialist on theoretical knowledge of legislative institutions and electoral systems, Michael Thies, argues that majoritarian institutions of the Anglo-American variety would have pushed politics toward broader coalitions, reducing the premiums captured by organized groups with extreme preferences, and appealing more to the interests of unorganized, diverse voters.
