Eighteen LDP members’ abstention from the vote signaled their passive support for the motion, thus forcing Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa to dissolve the Lower House on the same day and announce a general election for July 18.
The notion of restructuring (risutora) had been extensively discussed in relation to previous “normal scandal elections” which were happening on a frequent basis (in 1976, 1983, and 1990).
After the 1992 Sagawa scandal and the revelations concerning Shin Kanemaru’s excessiveness in illegal fundraising,[5] Prime Minister Miyazawa again promised political reform and claimed to put anti-corruption measures at the top of his agenda, this time on national television, but failed to deliver.
[6] Shin Kanemaru (1914-1996) was an influential figure in Japanese politics; he was the "kingmaker" who exercised his real power behind the scenes and had handpicked at least four prime ministers.
[7] The inability to enact political reform and promptly dealt with corruption issue frustrated the public and a portion of reformist LDP politicians.
The pre-1994 electoral system - Single Non-Transferable Vote in Multimember Districts (SNTV/MMD) - encouraged the proliferation of koenkai networks, money politics, and entrenching clientelistic behaviors in elections.
[13] Furthermore, the economic recession arising from the real estate bubble at the end of the 1980s and the LDP's failure to adjust severely tarnished its reputation.
[14] For instance, when Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi's high-handed dealing at the time of the revision of the Japan-United States security Treaty in 1960 resulted in the massive Anpo Protests,[15] the LDP attempted to calm public dissatisfaction by replacing him with Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda, who advocated the governmental slogan of “tolerance and patience” and diverted popular attention to economic affairs with his Income Doubling Plan.
When people experienced serious problems arising from the rapid growth of GNP, such as pollution and international trade conflicts at the end of the reign of the Ikeda cabinet, the LDP appointed Eisaku Sato as Ikeda's successor, who advocated “stable development” instead of “rapid growth.”[6] Nonetheless, this lack of change of government also hindered the process of establishing political responsibility in decision-making and cases of high-profile corruption.
[28] The most immediate adjustments prior to 1993 (December 1992) cut out ten rural seats and added nine urban ones, thus reducing the total membership of the lower house from 512 to 511.
Thus, individual politicians were invariably pressed to pursue a personal campaign strategy to differentiate themselves from even those from the same party,[30] characterizing the LDP's intra-party competition and leading to reliance on pork-barrel policy and candidate-based voting rather than on party-centered and issue-based electoral battles.
[18][31] The use of money to coordinate votes was acutely felt amongst Japanese constituents, where party affiliations were seldom strong,[32] and roughly half the electorate was undecided.
[24] The LDP candidates’ extensive contacts with Japanese business facilitated their ability to provide larger material benefits.
The LDP was severely criticized and, thus, suffered a decline in its seats in the Diet from 264 to 249 and lost its absolute majority in the House of Representatives election on December 5, 1976.
To serve their constituencies well, one of the major tasks of LDP politicians was to raise enormous amounts of political funds, most notably from business sector.
Cases of high-ranking politicians indicted on charges of corrupt practices related to their election funds abounded, although very few were convicted and sentenced.
He was charged of evading taxes on a massive personal fortune, 500 million yen, a large part of which he allegedly obtained through secret donations from the parcel delivery firm Tokyo Sagawa Kyubin.
Bubble economy is the abnormal rise in share values and land prices after the Plaza Accord of September 22, 1985 produced a dramatic appreciation of the yen.
[34] During the two-week official election campaign period, almost all candidates spoke about political reform, though none made it clear what that meant or how it was going to be achieved.
LDP Secretary-General Seiroku Kajiyama said “I don’t think Japan’s political business will move ahead under a coalition of forces with different opinions on security and foreign relations issues.” Former LDP Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe predicted that, in the event of an opposition victory, Japan would resemble Italy: “the Cabinet will be changing all the time, the economy will be in disarray, the number of thieves and beggars will increase, and so will robberies and rapes.”[36] The emergence of the non-LDP coalition government resulted from agreement on certain basic principles by conservative, centrist, and leftist opposition groups.
Additionally, there was general consensus on some other issues, including tax cuts which are needed to stimulate economic growth and anti-corruption measures.
The Japan Socialist Party (JSP) even relaxed several long-held positions - that was recognition of the constitutionality of Japan's Self-Defense Force, acceptance of the peace treaty with the Republic of Korea and approval of nuclear energy until alternatives are developed - so as to “put an end to the LDP’s monopoly of politics and establish a coalition government to accomplish political reform,” according to SDPJ Chairman Sadao Yamahana.
The 223 seats in the lower house the LDP was able to gain was 52 fewer than what the party held a month before and 33 votes short of a majority in the 511-member body.
However, in the event, the logic of coalition formation was overwhelmed by the prospect of the dissatisfied electorate who was demanding change and would refuse any alliance with the then-incumbent LDP.
[40] Although no longer holding a majority in the House of Representatives, the LDP remained the strongest party, both in terms of the popular vote and the number of seats gained.
[41][42] The current political change was not so much a product of the opposition's strength as it was of the LDP's weaknesses and internal dissension and the leader's incompetency regarding keeping the various factions together.
Additionally, LDP's new Secretary-General, Yoshiro Mori, pressed for an extension of the planned 10-day Diet session to enable economic issues to be debated, an area in which the party had overwhelming expertise.
[43] The coalition partners, meanwhile, unanimously settled on JNP Chairman Morihiro Hosokawa as Japan's new Prime Minister, although the more experienced Tsutomu Hata was initially preferred by the SDPJ and Komeito.
SDPJ Chairman Yamahana's statement that the coalition was working as an "emergency government" with an aim toward completing the task of political reform reinforced the possibility of elections in the near future, which was 10 months later.
Hosokawa stated that he would "take responsibility" (i.e., resign) if electoral reform was not introduced by the end of the year, and if it was, a new system would require new elections to be held under it.