Council of the Revolution The 1960 Ethiopian coup attempt (Amharic: የታህሳሱ ግርግር)[2] was a failed coup d'état perpetrated against Emperor Haile Selassie on 13 December 1960 by the Council of the Revolution, a cabal of four conspirators led by brothers Germame Neway and Brigadier General Mengistu Neway, commander of the Kebur Zabagna (Imperial Guard), that sought to overthrow the Emperor during a state visit to Brazil in order to install a progressive government.

The coup leaders declared the beginning of a new government under the rule of Haile Selassie's eldest son, Crown Prince Asfaw Wossen, that would address the numerous economic and social problems Ethiopia faced.

When Germame had attempted to encourage the Oromo inhabitants of Wellamu to build roads, bridges, and schools, he was opposed by the local landlords who agitated for his replacement.

"[5] Concludes Bahru Zewde, "The obstruction he encountered even in these remote posts convinced him of the need for change, and he began to work with his brother to that end.

Mengistu was vital to the success of Germame's plan because he commanded the Kebur Zabangna, the Emperor's imperial guard whose members were expected to follow orders without question, and had connections throughout the Ethiopian armed forces.

[7] Two more important members, Colonel Warqenah Gabayahu, imperial Chief of Security, and Brigadier-General Tsege Dibu, the Commissioner of Police, were recruited to form a clandestine "Council of the Revolution", and the group began planning their move.

[3] On the evening of Tuesday, 13 December 1960, the group duped several Ministers of the Imperial Crown and other important political personages into coming to Guenete Leul Palace in the capital, Addis Ababa, for an emergency meeting.

[10] The next morning, after the members of the coup had secured control of most of Addis Ababa, Crown Prince Asfaw Wossen, read a proclamation on national radio.

During this period Mengestu and his colleagues issued an 11-point programme of proposed reforms, and appointed as Prime Minister Ras Imru Haile Selassie and Major General Mulugeta Bulli, who was popular in the army, as Chief of Staff.

Makonnen Habte-Wold, whose own intelligence network had uncovered this plot, was unable to do more than send frantic telegrams to his Emperor "until the coup took place and he was captured and shot.

"[14]) Dejazmach Asrate Medhin Kassa, Major General Mared Mangesha, and the other loyalists spent their time more usefully; they secured the support of the tank squadron and the Imperial Ethiopian Air Force, both stationed within reach of the capital, and made up their initial shortage of troops by airlifting about 1,000 loyal soldiers in from outlying provinces; they also issued leaflets signed by Abuna Basilios, head of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, which condemned the rebels as anti-religious traitors and called for loyalty to Haile Selassie.

[18] Official casualty figures state that at least 300 people were killed, many of them civilians caught in the street fighting; Christopher Clapham considers them "likely to be underestimates", noting in a footnote that The East African Standard in Nairobi, in what was then Kenya Colony, estimated about 2,000 dead and wounded in its 20 December 1960 story.

"[19] The loyalty of Ethiopian paratrooper forces, trained in Israel, played a critical role in the swift suppression of the insurrection, with Israeli advisors providing guidance on how to respond during the crisis.

First, in his history of modern Ethiopia, Bahru points out an ironic element in this event: "By his colleagues he [Mulugeti Bulli] was more than half-expected to emulate the Egyptian colonel, Gamal Abdel Nasser, who staged a coup in 1952 that overthrew the dynasty, a century and a half old, of Mohammed Ali.

"[20] Yet Professor Bahru draws an even more apparent connection between the two, in a strikingly elegiac passage: Edmond Keller adds that following the coup, "rather than being able to dictate comfortably the rate and direction of change, the emperor was placed ever more on the defensive, having to work harder to mediate the demands of increasingly politically significant social groupings.

"[23] Selassie successfully avoided another coup attempt thanks to a tight system of control and his effective divide and rule policies, though it was clear that the regime was in a precarious position.