1988 Hong Kong electoral reform

Li said direct elections in 1988 would only sharpen the contradictions among different classes and segments of Hong Kong society, which would lead to political, economic, and social instability and would be harmful to a smooth transfer of sovereignty in 1997.

[2] However, after a private meeting between Hong Kong Governor David Wilson and PRC Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian on 20 June 1987, Li clarified that he never said the 1988 direct elections did not conform the spirit of Sino-British Joint Declaration.

[3] During the summer and fall of 1989, the local pro-Beijing organs and figures such as the Chinese General Chamber of Commerce joined forces with conservative business elites to actively oppose the introduction of direct election, which they argued would only undermine Hong Kong's stability and prosperity.

"[4] It was also reported that the Bank of China arranged for its employees to watch a video narrated by Ma Lik, who was the then deputy secretary general of the Hong Kong Basic Law Consultative Committee, explaining why the introduction of direct elections was a British conspiracy.

[5] Consequently, the pro-Beijing supporters mobilised 60,706 written submissions to the Hong Kong government objecting the 1988 direct elections, in which 50,175 came on cyclostyled forms and 22,722 were from the communist-controlled FTU.

[7] The largest pro-democracy alignment, the Joint Committee on the Promotion of Democratic Government which was formed in October 1986 bring together 190 organisations, launched series of campaign for the 1988 direct elections including the collection of 220,000 signatures with names and identity card numbers.

This behaviour of Hong Kong public was considered "a significant development in a society which traditionally avoided personal identification with a particular course of political action.

The decline in popular support for the direct elections were due to the opposition from the PRC government, the business sector and the pro-Beijing organisations such as the FTU.

[12] The official line was there was a strong public desire for further development of government, but there was no clear consensus timing or the extent of the introduction of direct elections.

[11] Governor David Wilson recalled events thus: ...it was convenient for us [the British], in terms of handling the transition with China, that we did not have...overwhelming pressure form people in Hong Kong to move straight away into direct elections because we knew that doing that would be very difficult for the Chinese to accept.