The resulting famine primarily affected residents living in the riverine area, predominantly in Bay Region, and those internally displaced by the civil war.

[3] In December 1992, UNITAF (Operation Restore Hope) was established to succeed UNOSOM I, deploying over 30,000 US military-led troops to Somalia with the initial objective of providing security for relief groups.

Before the full outbreak of the Somali Civil War, food shortages had started during summer of 1990 in the last year of President Siad Barres rule.

[12] Lacking supplies of their own to sustain themselves, Barres forces ravaged the grain stores of inter-riverine agricultural belt around the Jubba and Shebelle rivers.

[2] According to UNOSOM advisor John Drysdale:The famine was a combination of drought and a seven-month military occupation of the area by three divisions of Siad Barre’s army.

[20][1] Journalist and aid worker Michael Maren challenged the United Nations' claim that 4.5 million people in Somalia were on the verge of starvation, and asserted that the figure was created with the intention of galvanizing an international response.

[22] While many local Somali community initiatives had formed to provide famine relief,[19] they were soon overwhelmed by the scale of starvation sweeping Bay region.

The disintegration of Somali law enforcement paved the way for armed looters and criminals to steal food from storage sites and supply routes.

To safeguard their supplies, NGOs and relief agencies contracted Somali mercenaries or local fighters, often equipped with improvised combat vehicles, to escort their convoys.

[26] Many of the thieves at Mogadishu's sea and airport, the primary supply hub, were associated with the rebel United Somali Congress forces of Ali Mahdi and Mohamed Farah Aidid, but effectively demobilized.

The primary reason was that the lull in fighting in the south had allowed the first crop harvest in the Lower Shebelle region, which had proved to be surprisingly bountiful.

[3] On 12 August 1992, Aidid's Somali National Alliance agreed to the deployment of 500 UN troops to ensure the security of aid workers, under the direction of Mohamed Sahnoun.

According to Micheal Maren, "This temporary surge in death rates coincided with a huge international media attention that made all of Somalia seem like Bardera.

[12] By November 1992, largely owing to the mediation led by UNOSOM I head Mohamed Sahnoun, aid was flowing through the Mogadishu port unimpeded, with theft and banditry on the routes to famine zones averaging around 20%.

[41] Brauman observed that when the large international military coalition arrived in Somalia in December 1992, Somali-led convoys from Mogadishu, which were unprotected and delivered 400 tons of food, received minimal media coverage.

In contrast, just 20 kilometers away, heavily armed US military aid convoys transporting only 20 tons of food were swarmed by hundreds of journalists and TV crews.

[42] By early 1993 food prices had fallen well below production costs and farmers in the riverine areas reported grain stores full from previous unsold harvests.

Despite the significant improvement in mortality due to the resumption of agricultural production and international aid, death rates in southern Somalia were still above normal.

[1] According to the Refugee Policy Group NGO, approximately 10,000 of the 100,000 saved by foreign aid had been rescued following the deployment of U.S. and international troops during December 1992's Operation Restore Hope.

[45] In October 1992 United Nations Special Representative to Somalia Mohamed Sahnoun estimated that the majority of deliveries had around 15% looted, but that the number increased to as much as 40% of higher quality items.

[46] In an interview with American war correspondent Scott Peterson Sahnoun commented on looting by militias stating, "We see that there is a limit to the authority of Aidid and others, though they do not want to confess their inability to control, their powerlessness,"[47] Rony Brauman asserted that diversions averaged around 20 to 30%, and were often 'grossly exaggerated'[48] Some UN World Food Programme and UNOSOM officials went as far to claim that 80% of all food aid shipments were being looted, a figure that has been heavily disputed.

[43] The estimate was directly disputed by Pakistani Brigadier-General Imtiaz Shaheen (head of the first UN troop contingent to Somalia) in an interview with British journalist Mark Huband as Operation Restore Hope began in Mogadishu.

General Shaheen claimed that the amount of aid being looted was being exaggerated in order justify expanding the scope of the operation and that estimates of 80% were completely fabricated.