[1] There was some debate among the members of the SCAP legal officers who drafted the constitution and in the Imperial Diet meeting of 1946 over the extent of the power of the judiciary, but it was overshadowed by other major questions about popular sovereignty, the role of the emperor, and the renunciation of war.

[1] In 1948, the court declared that the constitution meant to establish the type of judicial review that was practiced in the United States.

[6] In 1971, the Supreme Court deliberately did not reappoint assistant judge Yasauaki Miyamoto, who participated in a legal organization associated with left-wing ideological leanings.

[9] Ultimately, the court was reshaped during the 1960s and 1970s to become more conservative, with more representation among the justices from lifetime government employees, which resulted in decisions that tended to limit free expression and public demonstration.

[5][10] In its second role, the Supreme Court can exercise its power of judicial review when a concrete legal dispute involving a violation or misinterpretation of the constitution is appealed.

[12] The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, through the office of the General Secretariat, also has extensive control over judicial personnel, including judges.

[16] Furthermore, in at least one case where a constitutional violation was found, regarding election district apportionment, the court has been unable to achieve compliance with its ruling.

One critical view is that the membership of the Supreme Court is influenced by the political dominance of the LDP, and therefore is less likely to challenge legislation produced by aligned politicians in the National Diet.

[15] Another critical view is that the court functions like a bureaucracy, with a conservative leadership promoting like-minded judges that less likely to make significant decisions.

[16][17] A historical perspective argues that the early judges were influenced by a Meiji Constitution and German jurisprudence tradition that did not allow striking down unconstitutional legislation, and that over time this expectation resulted in a reluctance to act in politically sensitive cases to maintain judicial independence.

[21] Of 217 submissions, one submitted through a joint effort of 17 people at Kajima led by architect Shinichi Okada was chosen.

[22] It is of steel-reinforced concrete construction, and makes ample use of Japanese white granite, just as the previous Supreme Court building did.