Over the next three years, 27,000 fixed-wing and 1,400 helicopter coalition flights took place in the zone to support humanitarian operations without interference from Iraqi aircraft or other military units.
The AWACS crew reported on station at its assigned surveillance orbit altitude of 32,000 feet (9,750 m) located inside Turkey just north of the northern border of Iraq at 08:45.
At Arbil and later at Salah ad Din, Iraq, Thompson planned to introduce Mulhern to two prominent Kurdish leaders, Masoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani, as well as to UN representatives.
Martin was the "Duke" or "ACE" airborne command element on the AWACS, meaning he was a rated aircrew member assigned to the crew to ensure that all engagement (combat) mandates were adhered to and executed as written in OPC policies.
Captain Dierdre Bell, an air surveillance officer on the AWACS, noticed that the Black Hawks' radar and IFF returns had disappeared and sent an electronic "attention arrow" to Wang's scope.
[9] At 10:20, Wickson, the F-15C flight lead, reported entering northern Iraq to the AWACS controller responsible for air traffic inside the TAOR, USAF Lieutenant Ricky Wilson.
Contrary to standard procedure, neither Tracy nor Wang spoke up at this point to request that the AWACS crew members attempt to identify the F-15s' radar contacts.
In response, the lead Black Hawk, piloted by McKenna, immediately turned left and dived for lower altitude in an apparent attempt to evade the unexpected attack.
"[20] By 13:15 local time, Kurdish civilians notified the MCC they had witnessed the two Black Hawks being shot down 40 miles (64 km) north of Arbil and that there were no survivors.
[21] Within hours, U.S. President Bill Clinton was briefed on the shootdown and called the heads of government of the United Kingdom and France, John Major and François Mitterrand, to express regret and sympathy for the deaths of their citizens in the incident.
"[30] The board found that combined OPC forces, led by Pilkington, Emery, Richardson, and other USAF officers, had failed to integrate helicopters into aircraft operations in the TAOR.
Thus, the CTF staff, under the direction of Colonel James Rusty O'Brien, USAF, had not tried to coordinate the U.S. Army Black Hawk missions into the daily ATOs.
In fact, neither O'Brien nor his predecessors had established any type of procedure for communicating information on Black Hawk missions to the Combined Forces Air Component (CFAC).
"[35] General Shalikashvili, now serving as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, added: "There were a shocking number of instances where people failed to do their job properly.
[38] On 17 November 1994 the USAF announced that Colwell had recommended to Croker that Wang face court-martial and that Halcli receive nonjudicial administrative action on the dereliction of duty charges.
Croker accepted Colwell's recommendation and ordered Wang to face court-martial and dismissed the criminal charges against the other AWACS crew members except Halcli, who was offered Article 15 action.
[41] On 27 December 1994 the USAF announced that Santarelli, an F-15 pilot, had dismissed the charges against May and had decided not to pursue criminal disciplinary actions against any other OPC personnel under his legal jurisdiction, including Wickson, Pilkington, Emery, Richardson, and O'Brien.
[47] Frank Spinner, Wang's civilian attorney, argued that USAF Chief of Staff General Merrill McPeak, a career fighter pilot, had made clear that he did not want Wickson and May punished for their actions in the shootdown.
Cited as evidence for this was a Los Angeles Times report, published also in the European Stars and Stripes newspaper on 18 June 1994 that said McPeak "strongly opposed" court-martial action for Wickson or May.
"[49] Major General Nolan Sklute, the USAF's top legal officer, stated, "An incident like this does not necessarily mean that the conduct of all those involved rises to the level of criminal culpability.
"[50] Secretary of the Air Force Sheila Widnall added, "The Black Hawk helicopters were downed as a result of a tragic series of errors and unfortunate events involving numerous people.
[54] On 10 August 1995 Fogleman spoke at a press conference at the Pentagon in which he announced the conclusions reached by his review into the accountability of USAF personnel involved in the shootdown incident.
Also, Fogleman wrote and placed "letters of evaluation" in the permanent personnel files of Wickson, May, Wang, Halcli, Wilson, Pilkington, and Emery that said each had failed "to meet Air Force standards in job knowledge, judgment and leadership".
Thorson later stated his belief that the USAF accident investigation report and subsequent proceedings had been manipulated in order to avoid holding Wickson and May accountable for their actions.
Thorson also stated that he believed Starr had submitted an inaccurate and misleading report on May's Article 32 hearing to the USAF commanding officers, including Dallager and Santarelli.
"[59] In August 1996, Roth's investigation board asked the DoD to produce the last four witnesses it wished to interview: Santarelli, Starr, Dallager, and Colonel C. G. Mangin.
Roth, whose committee chairmanship was scheduled to end the next month, was told by the U.S. Department of Justice that the U.S. Attorney General, Janet Reno, would not support him if he chose to take the dispute with the DoD to court.
"[63] In September 1995 the House National Security Subcommittee on Military Personnel, chaired by Bob Dornan, requested that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) conduct its own investigation into the shootdown incident.
[66] During the GAO's investigation, USAF OPC officers confirmed that the rivalry between the F-15 and F-16 communities was particularly pronounced and intense partly due to the fact that F-16 aircraft had scored all the air-to-air combat kills in Iraq and Bosnia since the end of the Gulf War.
After U.S. military presence ceased at Giebelstadt, due to base closures, the monument was moved to Fort Rucker, Alabama on 10 March 2006, and rededicated on 14 April 2007.