1994 Fairchild Air Force Base B-52 crash

On Friday, 24 June 1994, a United States Air Force (USAF) Boeing B-52 Stratofortress crashed at Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington, United States,[2] after its pilot, Lieutenant Colonel Arthur "Bud" Holland, maneuvered the bomber beyond its operational limits and lost control.

[3][4] The mission plan for the flight called for a demanding series of low-altitude passes, 60° banked turns, a steep climb, and a touch-and-go landing on Fairchild's runway 23.

[7] Apparently to avoid flying through the restricted airspace, Holland flew the aircraft in an extremely tight, steeply banked turn while maintaining the low, 250-foot (75 m) AGL altitude.

Approximately three-quarters of the way around the turn, at 14:16, the aircraft banked past 90°, descended rapidly, clipped power lines and hit the ground and exploded, killing the four crew members.

[9][failed verification] The AFR 110-14 investigation identified several factors which contributed to the crash, including the actual crash sequence, the personality and earlier behavior of Bud Holland, previous supervision and lack of corrective action exercised by USAF officers over Holland, mission planning and execution, and other environmental and human factors.

[8] The investigation found that as the B-52 entered its final turn sequence around the tower, its indicated airspeed (IAS) was 182 knots (337 km/h; 209 mph).

The first, Lieutenant Colonel Bullock, the current 325th Bomb Squadron commander, did not do anything about it and may have tried to use the videotape as leverage to coerce the navigator into accepting a position as mission scheduler for the wing.

The second, the deputy operations group commander, Lieutenant Colonel Harper, told the crew member to conceal the evidence.

The new wing commander, Brigadier General James M. Richards, and the new DO, Colonel William E. Pellerin, both witnessed the demonstration, but neither took any action.

Fearing for their safety, the photography crew ceased filming and took cover as Holland's aircraft again passed low over the ground, this time estimated as clearing the ridgeline by only three feet (1 m).

The squadron commander, Lieutenant Colonel Mark McGeehan, reported the incident to Pellerin and recommended that Holland be removed from flying duty.

Pellerin consulted with Holland and gave him an oral reprimand and warning not to repeat the behavior, but refused to take him off flying duty.

During the final flight, Holland performed a series of 60° banked turns and a 68° pitch climb in violation of Brooks' orders.

Due to the short notice of his assignment to the mission, Wolff did not participate in the pre-flight briefing and boarded the aircraft after the engines were started.

The investigation reported that, even if the proper stall recovery techniques had been applied, the aircraft was likely too low to recover before hitting the ground.

Holland's disregard for procedures governing the safe operation of the B-52 aircraft that he commanded and the absence of firm and consistent corrective action by his superior officers allowed Holland to believe that he could conduct his flight in an unsafe manner, culminating with the slow, steeply banked, 360° turn around the control tower.

[3][7][18][24] The other environmental factors involved, including the addition of a new maneuver (the 360° turn around the tower), inadequate pre-flight involvement of Colonel Wolff, and the distractions from the shooting four days prior, combined with Holland's unsafe and risk-taking piloting behavior to produce conditions favorable for the crash to occur.

The final factor, according to the USAF investigation report, was the 10-knot (19 km/h) wind and its effect on the maneuvers required to achieve the intended flightpath in relation to the ground.

[3][7][18][24] On 19 May 1995, Pellerin pleaded guilty at a USAF court-martial proceeding to two counts of dereliction of duty for his actions, or lack thereof, that contributed to the crash.

The USAF did not reveal whether any other officer involved in the chain of events leading to the crash received any type of administrative or disciplinary action.

To re-emphasize the importance of adherence to existing safety policies and correcting the actions of anyone violating them at any time, the USAF quickly distributed the findings of the accident investigation throughout the service.

These measures failed to prevent – sixteen years later – the occurrence in almost identical circumstances of another accident, when a C-17 transport aircraft crashed shortly after taking off from Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska, on an aerial-display practice flight.

[26] Today, the Fairchild crash is used in both military- and civilian-aviation environments, as a training aid in teaching crew resource management and to show the importance of enforcing safety regulations.

[27][28] Footage of the Fairchild crash was used in the making of the 2015 film Project Almanac, depicting an airline accident, which sparked public anger among relatives of Wolff and McGeehan.

Turning flight stall illustrated: the tighter the turn, the greater the lift (and thus angle of attack , AoA) required to counter the sum of centrifugal force and weight. If the critical AoA is exceeded, the aircraft will stall, regardless of the airspeed remaining constant.
Basic structure of USAF wings, groups, and squadrons
Lt Col Mark McGeehan, the copilot on the accident flight