A general election for the House of Representatives was not supposed to be due until July 1997, but on 27 September 1996, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto dissolved the parliament, thus calling for a snap-election.

This move to call premature elections had been widely expected as the Prime Minister's last effort to sustain power in the midst of a controversial sales hike.

The multi-member constituencies were replaced with single member districts, and separate party list seats chosen proportionately.

[2] Prior to 1993, each district was represented by multiple members, sometimes from the same party, leading to severe corruption and intra-party competition.

As a result, a new system emerged, adopting both the single member district (SMD) competition and proportional representation (PR).

The move for formation began in June 1996 when Hatoyama announced his idea of organizing a third force in Japanese politics against the LDP and the New Frontier Party.

However, the few campaign issues that were of the public's interest included the electoral reforms, potential raise in consumption tax, and how the large coalitions will play out.

While reflecting on the past 50-years of administrative policy prioritizing production and supply with strong centralization and bureaucratization as an effective method in simultaneously achieving economic growth and tackling social inequality, the LDP admits this system is "at a deadlock" considering the situation regarding women, increasing urban-rural disparities and the issue of low-birth rate.

His ambition was, without doubt, met with strong resistance from the bureaucrats, who stood almost unchallenged at the center of public life during the high growth period.

Hashimoto sought to focus power in the hands of the prime minister and subsequently political leadership by combining former bureaucratic agencies (twenty-three ministerial level organizations to twelve) and replacing the Prime Minister's Office with a new Cabinet Office.

Additionally, the new Cabinet Office was composed with advisory councils, appointed from both within and outside the government, to the prime minister on economic and fiscal policies.

If the economic bureaucracy in the 1960s and 1970s imposed on the Prime Minister's office and the Diet their own members as a method to secure supremacy over policy-making decision,[9] then Hashimoto also increased the power of political leaders by replacing vice ministers with Diet members whom he trusted.

[8] The leader of the opposing coalition NFP's manifesto was directly against that of the LDP, introducing the "5 contracts with the people (国民との５つの契約)", aimed at "revitalizing the lives of citizens" for the coming 21st century.

This provision was met with harsh commentary from the press who criticized the system as a method through and around which incompetent candidates move in their search for a Diet position.

The Diet responded to this unanticipated consequence by holding by-elections on the same day twice a year for both upper and lower houses.

[8] Unrevised campaign restrictions meant that candidates running in the SMD tier were still permitted to mobilize votes by means of a provision of constituency services and benefits to their district.

To win in a multiple-seats constituency, it was important for candidates to hold expertise and influence in a policy-sector in the district they were running for.

Those running in the PR tier needed to increase party vote, as such found it necessary to specialize in order to serve a large-scale and more diverse audience across an extensive geographical area.

In the first election of 1996, the LDP relied on the strategy of coalition to oust the ruling Japan Socialist Party (JSP) from power.

This arrangement proved as a gateway to death for the JSP, whom repudiated many of its defining principles, namely the anti-Self Defense Forces and anti-US alliance stances, in exchange for prime-minister's office.

[8] Yet, the scholars Krauss and Pekkanen show that politicians, in spite of such incentive, concentrated on spreading their Koenkai to the new district.

[8] Since the very first 1996 election, there was little evidence that party branches were replacing Koenkai in the assistance of daily activities, electoral mobilization and campaign funding.

Individual Diet members who carry out illegal campaign activities are now subjected to prosecution by the courts, including a possibility of being banned from elections.

A notable case is Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's effort to reduce faction's power in cabinet formation and party leader selection.

[10] The new advisory councils within the Cabinet Office later proved to be instrumental for succeeding prime ministers in their quest for policy-making authority.